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Abstract 
Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) face difficult decisions about which health care 
interventions are worthwhile given existing constraints on health care expenditure.  Decisions 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŽŵĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĐŽƐƚƐŽĨƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?Ă ‘ƐƵƉƉůǇ
ƐŝĚĞ ?ĐŽƐƚ-effectiveness threshold (CET) that represents the likely health effects of changes in health 
care expenditure. 
 
This paper provides a framework for generating country-level CETs using existing published 
estimates of the mortality effect of health expenditure.  Two different estimation strategies are used 
(Bokhari et al (2007) and Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015)) and, where possible, estimation is 
extended to include other measures of mortality, survival and disability outcomes, reflecting the 
demographic and other characteristics of each LMIC. 
 
The results suggest that CETs representing likely health opportunity costs tend to be below the lower 
bound suggested by WHO of 1x GDP per capita.  Hence, many previous and existing 
recommendations about which interventions are cost-effective that are based on the WHO 
threshold are likely to do more harm than good.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Policy context  
Policy-makers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), just as in high-income countries (HICs), 
face difficult decisions about how to use the available health care resources to achieve the greatest 
improvement in agreed social objectives in a way that is accountable.1  An important objective of 
health care is to improve health itself, which includes improvements in survival and reductions in 
morbidity.  This requires an assessment of whether the improvement in health outcomes offered by 
investing additional resources in a health intervention (which may be a technology, service or a 
whole programme of care) exceeds the improvement in health that would have been possible if the 
additional resources required had, instead, been made available for other health care activities.  
Therefore, some assessment of the health opportunity costs of additional health care expenditure is 
unavoidable if the best use is to be made of available resources. 
 
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) provide a useful summary of the additional costs of a 
proposed intervention and the additional health benefit it offers.  However, to decide whether the 
intervention will improve health outcomes overall (so can be regarded as cost-effective and should 
be approved, reimbursed or included in a benefits package) a comparison is required with an 
assessment of the likely health opportunity costs, commonly described as a cost-effectiveness 
threshold (CET) (Drummond et al. 2015).  To date much effort has been devoted to assessing the 
incremental costs and effects of proposed interventions but there remains much confusion about 
what a cost-effectiveness threshold ought to represent and what type of evidence might inform its 
assessment.  The values recommend or cited by decision making and advisory bodies (both national 
and supra national) have not been evidence based and reflect a lack of conceptual clarity (Revill et 
al. 2014). 
 
Research in the UK has demonstrated that an empirical assessment of the expected health 
opportunity costs is possible, based on an estimate of the health effects of changes in health care 
expenditure (Claxton, Martin, et al. 2015).  A similar approach is possible based on existing estimates 
of the effect of different levels of (and changes in) health care expenditure on mortality outcomes 
using cross country level data.  We demonstrate how these estimates can be extended to include 
the likely impact on length and quality of life (measured by Disability Adjusted Life Years, DALYs), 
reflecting a countrǇ ?Ɛ demography, epidemiology, level of health care expenditure, income and other 
characteristics (Salomon et al. 2012).  Any estimates will rest on whether the health effects of 
changes in health expenditure can be identified from aggregate cross-country level data.  Despite 
the challenges, we are able to provide a range of estimates of a cost per DALY threshold for up to 89 
low- and middle-income countries.  This demonstrates that some empirical assessment of cost per 
DALY thresholds for particular countries is possible using published evidence and other data 
currently available.  Importantly, it is now possible to make what was previously an abstract and 
confused concept real.  Its assessment can help inform decision making within low- and middle-
income countries and influence how other supra national bodies make recommendations and 
investment and purchasing decisions. 
 
1.2 What should the cost-effectiveness threshold represent? 
The confusion about what a CET ought to represent is evident in the values recommended or cited 
by decision making and advisory bodies.  In particular, there has been a failure to clearly distinguish 
the  ‘demand side ? (what the value of health and health care expenditure should be) and the  ‘supply 
sides ? (what improvement in health is possible given existing resources). 
                                                          
1
 &ŽƌĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ?ǁĞĚĞĨŝŶĞ>D/ƐďǇƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐďǇŝŶĐŽŵĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
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The  ‘demand side ? notion of the threshold has been expressed in two subtly different ways: i) 
aspirational values, which represent a particular view of what value ought to be placed on 
improvements in health (Revill et al. 2014); and ii) those founded on evidence from willingness to 
pay and value of a statistical life studies (using stated or revealed preferences) (Ryen & Svensson 
2014; Viscusi & Aldy 2003), which represent the value that individuals are thought to place on health 
improvement.  Both imply what health care expenditure ought to be.  Therefore, they are a  ‘demand 
side ? concept, which rests on disputed questions of social value, rather than being founded on the 
health effects of the resources currently devoted to health (a supply side concept, which is an 
empirical question) (Drummond et al. 2015).  There is a real danger that demand side values, and 
especially aspirational ones might be substantially higher than an assessment of what the health 
opportunity costs actually are (the supply side).  As a consequence their use is likely to reduce 
overall population health and exacerbate healthcare inequalities.  They also fail to identify the real 
(and potentially much greater) value of devoting more resources to health care.  For this reason they 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚcontribute to greater accountability in low- and middle-, as well as in high-income countries, 
for the health care and other expenditure decisions made at a local, national and supra national 
level (Revill et al. 2014). 
 
Thresholds that are cited are often ĂƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ǁŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ ?Žƌ ‘ŶŽƌŵƐ ? that are not founded 
on the empirical question posed by the supply side notion of health opportunity cost.  HICs such as 
the US and UK have applied values of US$50,000-$100,000 and GB£20,000-30,000 per quality 
adjusted life year (QALY), respectively, with the latter being used as a key criteria in decisions made 
by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK (Neumann et al. 2014; 
Grosse 2008).  This explicit threshold range has been used by NICE since 2004 (National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence 2004), and is based on the values implied by the decisions it made between 1999 
and 2003 (Rawlins & Culyer 2004).  As such it has become an established norm, which, at best, 
represents how NICE makes decisions (current evidence suggests that the thresholds implied by its 
decisions are, in fact, much higher (Dakin et al. 2014; Devlin & Parkin 2004)) rather than an empirical 
assessment of either the demand or supply side (Claxton, Sculpher, et al. 2015). 
 
TŚĞ “t,K-,K/ƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ? of 1-3x GDP per capita has been widely cited as criteria for cost-
effectiveness in LMIC settings.  Based on a 2001 report by the Macroeconomic Commission on 
Health (MCH), it relies on estimates of the value of a statistical life (WHO 2001; Jamison et al. 2013).  
These were adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2005 to serve as a guide alongside 
WHO-CHOICE (WHO 2015).  They have been used as generic and internationally applicable criteria to 
classify interventions being evaluated as highly cost-effective (less than 1x GDP per capita), cost-
effective (less than 3x GDP per capita) or not cost-effective (3x GDP per capita or higher) (Marseille 
et al. 2015).  The problem is that these widely cited criteria are aspirational ones, which reflect a 
particular view of what the  ‘ĚĞŵĂŶĚ-ƐŝĚĞ ?ought to be.  /ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚaccount for the 
 ‘ƐƵƉƉůǇ-ƐŝĚĞ ?ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇĐŽƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐƵŶĚĞƌĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ. 
 
Despite the widely recognised shortcomings of the 1-3x GDP norms (Newall et al. 2014; Marseille et 
al. 2015), they have been commonly used as criteria in LMIC settings of which few (or even HICs for 
that matter) have their own country-specific CET estimates.  One exception is the Health 
Intervention and Technology Assessment Program (HITAP) in Thailand, which uses a CET based on 
estimates of willingness to pay derived from stated preference methods (Thavorncharoensap et al. 
2013; Nimdet & Ngorsuraches 2015; The Subcommittee for Development of the National List of 
Essential Medicines 2007; Jirawattanapisal et al. 2009).  It represents a  “ƐŽĐŝĂůǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ health 
relative to other consumption opportunities, so it is an estimate of a possible  ‘ĚĞŵĂŶĚ-ƐŝĚĞ ?, which 
although empirically derived, does not necessarily represent what the  ‘ƐƵƉƉůǇ-ƐŝĚĞ ?currently 
delivers. 
 
Cost per DALY averted thresholds for low- and middle-income countries: evidence from cross country data  3 
 
 
A threshold representing the health opportunity cost (or the shadow price of the resource 
constraint) is consistent with an objective of maximising health within a constrained optimisation 
problem (Epstein et al.; Stinnett & Paltiel 1996; Weinstein & Zeckhauser 1973).  As health care 
systems in all countries face some restrictions on the growth in health care expenditure, the CET 
should reflect these supply side health opportunity costs2.  As well as having a well worked and 
sound theoretical foundation, recent research has sought to inform its assessment by estimating the 
health effects of changes in health expenditure.  Such estimates represent health opportunity costs 
(of marginal changes3) either when an intervention is funded from additional resources (the health 
effects of other things likely to be done if the resources where made available for other health care 
uses), or when the resources required must be found from existing commitments (the health effects 
of those things that are likely to be given up). 
 
Therefore, the problem of estimating a CET that represents health opportunity cost is the same as 
estimating the relationship between changes in health care expenditure and health outcome 
(typically measured as QALYs gained or DALYs averted4).  This is the approach that was taken in 
research conducted in the United Kingdom, which used national data on expenditure and outcomes 
in different areas of disease (programme budget categories) reported at a local level (Martin et al. 
2008; Claxton, Martin, et al. 2015).  By exploiting the variation in expenditure and mortality 
outcomes, the relationship between changes in spending and mortality was estimated while 
accounting for sources of endogeneity5.  With additional information about age and gender of the 
patient population these mortality effects can be expressed as a cost per life-year threshold 
(£25,241 per life year).  By using the effect of expenditure on the mortality and life-year burden of 
disease as a surrogate for the effects on a more complete measure of health burden (one that also 
includes morbidity burden), a cost per QALY threshold that reflects the likely impact of expenditure 
on both mortality and morbidity was estimated (£12,936 per QALY). 
 
The data demands of this type of within country analysis may be excessive for many other countries 
and particularly in LMICs.  As a result the rapid replication of this study design may not be possible in 
most LMICs.  It does however pose the question of  ‘what does the evidence that is available suggest 
about the scale of health opportunity costs in other countries ? ? For example, (Woods et al., 2015) 
uses the UK estimate and extrapolates to other countries based on the existing evidence of the 
income elasticity of the value of health (Hammitt & Robinson 2011; Milligan et al. 2014; Getzen 
2000) and purchasing power parity.  They show that adjusting the UK estimate with what is currently 
known about the income elasticity, CETs based on opportunity costs may be much lower than the 1-
3xGDP per capita norms. 
 
This paper represents a next logical step, by asking what do existing estimates of the effect of 
different levels of (and changes in) health care expenditure on mortality outcomes using cross 
country level data suggest about the scale of health opportunity costs is LMICs.  To do so we extend 
existing estimates to include the likely impact on length and quality of life (measured by Disability 
                                                          
2
 Even when there are no restrictions on the growth in health care expenditure, reimbursing or covering a higher-cost 
intervention will increase the costs of private insurance and/or out-of-pocket expenditure. Therefore, opportunity costs 
will fall on both consumption (those who are able and willing to pay the higher costs) and indirectly on health as well 
(those unable or unwilling to pay). 
3
 If changes are large relative to total resources (non marginal) then health opportunity costs are likely to be 
underestimated when resources need to be found from existing commitments, i.e., the threshold is likely to be lower for 
larger budget impacts (more health is likely to be given up).  Equally, the health gains from non marginal increases in 
resources are likely to be lower. 
4
 Units of health are typically measured as QALYs or DALYs. Note that a gain in health is an increase in QALYs, but is 
referred to as a decrease in DALYs. 
5
 Most importantly simultaneity where health outcomes both determine and are determined by expenditure e.g., poorer 
outcomes in one disease area might lead to more spending in that area but more spending will also improve outcomes (see 
section 1.3 below). 
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Adjusted Life Years, DALYs (Salomon et al. 2012) ? ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ĞƉŝĚĞŵŝŽůŽŐǇ ?
level of health care expenditure, income and other characteristics. 
 
1.3 Estimating the health effects of changes in health care expenditure  
The extent to which health outcomes are affected by health care expenditure is a fundamental 
question that has been investigated over many years.  Whilst, intuitively, health expenditure ought 
to be a positive input into health production, the challenges involved in identifying this effect have 
meant that empirical work has produced mixed results.  Whether work is being conducted over time 
or across countries, researchers have often struggled to control for all possible external factors that 
may affect health. 
 
The challenges include the important differences between countries (heterogeneity), much of which 
cannot be fully captured and controlled for using existing data, even if it is assumed that 
systematically unbiased measurements are available.  An early example in the literature of a macro-
level study employing a conventional regression analysis is Cochrane et al. (1978).  The authors 
examined the relationship between mortality rates, gross national product and consumption of 
inputs including health care provision among 18 developed countries.  Their analysis was unable to 
find a strong and robust relationship between greater quantities of health care and reduced 
mortality.  More recently, Or (2001), analysing data across 21 OECD countries between 1970 and 
1995 with similar methods, found a substantial reduction in mortality associated with increasing 
doctor numbers. Looking at 15 countries in the EU between 1980 and 1995, Nixon & Ulmann (2006) 
performed a regression analysis with health outcomes (life expectancy at birth for males and 
females and infant mortality) as the dependent variable and many health and health care 
independent variables including per capita health care expenditure.  Whilst they conclude that 
health care inputs have a significant impact upon infant mortality, they result in only modest 
improvements in life expectancy. 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that there is no consistent finding amongst the above studies, since a 
conventional regression analysis requires assuming that many of the independent variables 
considered are exogenous, which is unlikely to be a plausible assumption in this context owing to 
issues of simultaneity6 and omitted variable bias (Gravelle & Backhouse 1987).  In addition, Gravelle 
and Backhouse (1987) note that the effects of health care on health outcomes are likely to be lagged 
and not contemporaneous.  In recent years, more sophisticated statistical methods that recognise 
these challenges and attempt to overcome them have been applied to cross-country data to address 
this research question where certain variables are allowed to be endogenous.  The key contribution 
of these methods is that variables are allowed to be endogenous by identifying instrumental 
variables (IV), which should determine the level of the endogenous independent variable, but not 
affect the dependent variable other than indirectly through the impact of the endogenous 
independent variable (Cawley 2015).  The IV approach provides identification through random 
variation in the endogenous variable under consideration. 
 
Bokhari et al. (2007) applies this method to cross-sectional data and models both public expenditure 
on health and a country's GDP as endogenous variables.  In addition, donor funding (external funds), 
which represents a significant proportion of health care financing in LMICs, is explicitly incorporated 
into the model. Bokhari et al. (2007) find a statistically and economically significant effect of public 
expenditure on health reducing three mortality outcomes.  An IV approach has also been applied to 
panel data in a number of cases inter alia Filmer & Pritchett (1999), Wagstaff & Claeson (2004) and 
Moreno-Serra & Smith (2015). Among these, Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) employ an innovative 
                                                          
6
 Poor health outcomes might prompt more health expenditure, but more health expenditure will also improve outcomes, 
i.e., health outcomes both determine and are determined by expenditure. 
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approach where reverse causality is explicitly modeled by employing a method described in 
Brückner (2013).  This method requires an IV for health rather than health care expenditure, and the 
reverse causality effect of health on health care expenditure is first modeled before finding the 
causal effect of health care expenditure on health.  Other potential causes of endogeneity are 
mitigated by the inclusion of fixed effects and differential effects of health care expenditure on 
health are allowed for through an LMIC interaction term.  In contrast with Filmer and Pritchett 
(1999) and Wagstaff and Claeson (2004), Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) are able to identify a 
statistically and economically significant reduction in mortality due to increases in different types of 
health care expenditures. 
 
The framework of analysis set out in this paper can be applied to the results of any econometric 
study thought to identify plausible effects on mortality of changes or differences in health 
expenditure (regardless of statistical significance).  The selected studies Bokhari et al. (2007) and 
Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) are chosen because they find plausible and statistically significant 
effects of expenditure and represent the most sophisticated and coherent modeling strategies given 
the econometric challenges of the research questions.  They also provide an opportunity to 
demonstrate how survival effects can be derived when mortality effects are estimated as elasticities 
or as absolute effects, while reflecting the epidemiology and demographics of specific countries.  In 
addition, they enable the evaluation of how direct estimation of survival and morbidity effects can 
be used to adjust mortality based estimates and examine the plausibility of the assumptions that 
might otherwise be required. 
 
1.4 Aims and objectives 
The purpose of this paper is to show how these cross-country econometric models, using Bokhari et 
al. (2007) and Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) as examples of two different approaches, can be used 
as an input for calculating country-specific CETs through analysis of other health outcomes, use of 
additional data and explicitly made modeling assumptions. 
1.5 Report structure 
Chapter 1 of this report has sought to clarify why an estimate of health opportunity costs is a key 
assessment and introduce the literature relevant to estimating appropriate CETs for LMICs.  It has 
emphasized the need for further research making best use of currently available evidence and data, 
to which this paper contributes.  Chapters 2 and 3 answer four successive questions that allow us to 
estimate a cost per DALY averted CET: 
1. What are the mortality effects of changes in expenditure? 
2. What are the survival effects of changes in expenditure? 
3. What are the morbidity effects of changes in expenditure? 
4. What are the combined survival and morbidity effects of changes in expenditure? 
 
Chapter 2 answers each of these questions in turn using Bokhari et al's (2007) model and dataset 
alongside additional data from the World Bank and the Global Burden of Disease (GBD).  The 
assumptions necessary to get from estimates of the effect of changes in health expenditure on 
mortality to survival, morbidity and both combined are outlined and discussed (see sections 2.1 to 
2.4).  Chapter 3 is similarly structured, but uses key input parameters from the Moreno-Serra and 
Smith (2015) model (see sections 3.1 to 3.4).  The results from the two sources of estimated 
parameters are presented in 2.5 and 3.5 respectively.  Finally, Chapter 4 concludes by comparing 
results to those generated in related papers in the literature before drawing out some implications 
for policy and future research.  A full table of country-specific CETs generated in this paper can be 
found in the Appendix.  
6  CHE Research Paper 122 
2. Estimates based on cross sectional data 
Bokhari et al. (2007) uses a cross-section of 127 countries from the year 2000 and focuses on the 
effect of public expenditure on health on under-5 mortality and maternal mortality.  They consider 
ƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ'Wand public expenditure on health  W along with a number of interactions of 
public expenditure on health and other covariates  W are endogenous, and use several IVs including 
economic and political variables as well as the military expenditures of neighbouring countries.  
Their results indicate that the mean elasticity of public expenditure under-5 mortality is -0.33 and 
the corresponding maternal mortality mean elasticity over countries is -0.50. 
 
Given that the dataset used by Bokhari et al (2007) is a cross-section, we are able to expand their 
dataset to also estimate other outcomes of interest using data from GBD that are not available in 
panel form, but exist for the year 2000, as well as additional data from the World Bank.  This means 
we can employ the Bokhari et al (2007) model, exactly as in the published paper, but substitute the 
mortality outcomes for country-level adult aged 15-60 male and female mortality, YLL per capita, 
YLD per capita and DALY per capita outcomes.7  By doing this we are able to directly answer the 
questions that we would like to address: 'what are the survival effects of changes in expenditure?' 
and 'what are the morbidity effects of changes in expenditure?'  This is one of the key ways in which 
Chapter 2 differs from Chapter 3, where fewer outcomes are estimated since the Moreno-Serra and 
Smith (2015) model is estimated using a panel data structure and thus values for YLL, YLD and DALY 
per capita are not available on a year-by-year basis.  Given the range of outcomes we can estimate in 
the current section, we are ultimately able to calculate DALYs averted in four different ways. 
2.1 What are the mortality effects of changes in expenditure? 
Bokhari et al. (2007) estimate the effect of public expenditure on health on under-5 and maternal 
mortality.  These estimates, while interesting in their own right, do not provide enough information 
about how mortality among the full population is affected by changes in expenditure.  (This would 
require, for example, extrapolating from maternal or under-5 mortality to the full adult population).  
We were able to use their data and model to better determine the effect of changes in expenditure 
on mortality across the full population by running their model on additional mortality outcomes: 
adult male and adult female mortality, which are also available from the World Bank.  Although 
adult male and female mortality only cover individuals ages 15-60, using these variables alongside 
under-5 mortality gives us the greatest coverage of the population available in existing cross-country 
data.  As mortality rates are reported annually under-5, adult male and adult female mortality are 
also estimated using the Moreno-Serra and Smith estimation strategy in Chapter 3. 
 
In the model employed by Bokhari et al. (2007), all variables are log transformed prior to estimation 
of the model, and the resulting regression coefficients are therefore interpreted as elasticities.  
When the under-5 mortality elasticity of public expenditure on health is -0.33, this should be 
interpreted as saying that a 1% increase in public expenditure on health causes a 0.33% reduction in 
under-5 mortality.  Assuming a constant elasticity between health expenditure and health is 
consistent with a Cobb-Douglas health production function where there may be diminishing 
marginal returns to health expenditure.  Bokhari et al. (2007) also allow the outcome elasticity of 
public expenditure on health to vary by country through the use of interaction terms.  In so doing 
ƚŚĞŝƌŵŽĚĞůĂƐƐƵŵĞƐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƉƵďůŝĐĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞŽŶŚĞĂůƚŚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ “ŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞĚŽƌ
ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ?ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƚǁŽĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ PƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŽŶŽƌĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƉůĞĚŐĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?
(assumed to be dispersed in the year 2000) from the historical average level of donor funding 
(measured as the average level pledged between 1993 and 1997); and the level of infrastructure (as 
                                                          
7
 The authors would like to thank Farasat Bokhari for the generous provision of the data and Stata code used in Bokhari et 
al. (2007).  In doing this, data was not available for Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines.  As a consequence, no results are presented for these countries in this section. 
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captured by using paved roads per unit area).  Since the levels of these two factors vary between 
countries, the resulting elasticities also vary between countries.8 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for estimated elasticities among LMICs 
 Under-5 mortality Adult male mortality Adult female mortality 
Min -0.36 -0.20 -0.20 
Max -0.25 -0.08 -0.10 
Mean -0.33 -0.18 -0.18 
 
We can move from estimates of the effect of hypothetical changes in expenditure on mortality to 
obtain cost per DALY averted thresholds through a series of steps similar to those undertaken by 
Claxton et al (2015).9  To begin, the estimated country-specific elasticities can be used to calculate 
the number of deaths averted by changes in expenditure in a given country using ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ 
baseline mortality rates for different age and gender categories, by subtracting the number of 
deaths after the change in expenditure from the number of deaths before the change in 
expenditure. 
 
The available mortality rates are not crude mortality rates (i.e., deaths per 1,000 population), but 
instead cumulative mortality rates.  We cannot simply multiply this mortality rate by the population 
to obtain the absolute number of deaths in a given country.  The under-5 mortality rate is the 
cumulative probability of death by age 5, and the adult mortality rates are the cumulative probability 
of death by age 60 conditional on being alive at age 15. Thus a three-step process is necessary to 
determine the absolute number of deaths by age and gender in a country from the World Bank 
mortality rates. 
 
Equations 1-7 show how to obtain deaths averted for each group ݃ adult males or adult females.  
First, the annual rate given the cumulative rate provided by World Bank mortality rate for males or 
females ܯܴ௣௥௘௜௚ must be calculated.  Assuming here, but relaxed later, a constant rate over time, 
and using the 45 year mortality probability (i.e. from ages 15 to 60), the annual adult male and 
female mortality rates prior to the change in expenditure for a given country i are calculated as: 
 
(1) ܣܯܴ௣௥௘௜௚ ൌ െ ሺሺ ? െܯܴ௣௥௘௜௚ሻȀ ? ? ? ?ሻȀ ? ? 
 
We divide by 1,000 to account for the fact the mortality rate is expressed in multiples of 1,000.  As 
the risk of death is not constant between ages 15 and 60 and increases with age, multiplying the 
constant annual mortality rate from (1) by population in each age category would give an inaccurate 
number of absolute baseline deaths.  Thus a second step is required whereby the constant mortality 
rates calculated in (1) are weighted by known mortality rates.  This enables us to obtain more 
accurate mortality rates and thus more accurate calculations of absolute deaths.  The Global Burden 
of Disease (GBD) provides mortality rates by five-year age category (and split into separate 
categories for 0-1 and 1-4 year olds) for each country and we use these to weight the constant rates 
obtained from equation (1) for each five-year age category from 15 to 60.  The gender specific 
weight for each five-year age category is calculated as 
 
(2) ܯܴݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ௜௝௚ ൌ  ܩܤܦ ௜ܲ௝௚Ȁܩܤܦ పܲ௚തതതതതതതതതത 
 
                                                          
8
 A table including all the elasticities is provided in Appendix 1. 
9
 Similar to the main results from Claxton et al (2015), our results are also presented in terms of cost per undiscounted 
health benefits. 
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where ܩܤܦ ௜ܲ௝௚ is the GBD probability of death for the given age category j in country i. And ܩܤܦ పܲ௚തതതതതതതതതത 
is the average mortality rate among ages 15-60 for males or females in country i.  Weighting by 
mortality rates by five-year age category (as opposed to annual age-specific mortality rates, which 
are not available) implicitly assumes that the mortality rate is constant across those five years and 
that the population within that five-year age category is divided evenly across each age that makes 
up the category.10  This is, however, a less stringent assumption than assuming that mortality rates 
are constant across all ages between 15 and 60.  The third and final step is to calculate total absolute 
baseline deaths. 
 
(3) ܾܽݏ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௣௥௘௜௚ ൌ  ? ሺܣܯܴ௣௥௘௜௝௚ כ ܯܴݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ௜௝௚ כ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௚ଽ௝ୀଵ ሻ 
 
In order to calculate the number of deaths averted by the change in expenditure, we need to 
calculate absolute deaths after the hypothetical change in expenditure.  Once the mortality rate 
after the change in expenditure is calculated, this process mirrors equations (1)  W (3) above.  The 
mortality rate after the change in expenditure ܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜௚for group ݃ of males or females from the 
estimated country specific elasticity: 
 
(4) ܯܴ௣௢௦௧೔೒ ൌ  ܯܴ௣௥௘௜௚ െ ሺܯܴ௣௥௘௜௚ כ ሺെ ? כ ܽ݀ݑ݈ݐܯܴ݈݁ܽݏݐ݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௜௚ሻ 
 
From this, the annual mortality rate after the change in expenditure ܣܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜௚ for males or females 
is: 
 
(5) ܣܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜௚ ൌ െ ሺሺ ? െܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜௚ሻȀ ? ? ? ?ሻȀ ? ? 
 
The same gender specific weights as calculated in equation (2) for each age group are used, and the 
number of deaths in each age category after the change in expenditure is calculated as: 
 
(6) ܾܽݏ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௣௢௦௧௜௚ ൌ  ? ሺܣܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜௝௚ כ ܯܴݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ௜௝௚ כ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௚ሻଽ௝ୀଵ  
 
Equations (1) through (6) are calculated separately for females and males using the different 
baseline mortality rates and elasticities for each gender.  Subtracting deaths post-change from 
deaths pre-change gives deaths averted: 
 
(7) ܽ݀ݑ݈ݐ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ ൌ  ? ሺܾܽݏ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௣௥௘௜௚ െ ܾܽݏ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௣௢௦௧௜௚ሻଶ௚ୀଵ  
 
The same strategy is used to determine the annual mortality rate among children under-5 in a given 
country.11  We first determine the pre-change annual mortality rate among children under 5 ܣݑ ?ܯܴ௣௥௘௜ again assuming  W at first  W that the rate is constant over time.  A 5 year mortality 
probability (i.e. from ages 0 to 5) is used, and we divide by 1,000 as before to account for the fact 
the mortality rate expressed in multiples of 1,000. 
 
(8) ܣݑ ?ܯܴ௣௥௘௜ ൌ െ ሺሺ ? െ ݑ ?ܯܴ௣௥௘௜ሻȀ ? ? ? ?ሻȀ ? 
 
                                                          
10
 We believe this is a reasonable assumption to make given that the conditional life expectancy information available also 
only breaks down into five-year age categories, and as a result, the value of having more granular information at this stage 
would be lost at the next stage where years of life lost averted are calculated. 
11
 Data on under-5 mortality rate by gender was not available. 
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where ݑܯܴ௣௥௘௜ is under 5 mortality rate from the World bank.  To accurately calculate the baseline 
number of absolute deaths in this age group GBD mortality rates for 0-1 and 1-4 year olds for each 
country are used to weight the constant annual rates obtained from equation (8).  These weights are 
calculated for only two age categories j: 0-1 year olds and 1-4 year olds. 
 
(9) ݑ ?ܯܴݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ௜௝ ൌ  ܩܤܦ ௜ܲ௝Ȁܩܤܦ పܲǡ௨ହതതതതതതതതതതതത 
 
Baseline absolute deaths are calculated as: 
 
(10) ݑ ?݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௣௥௘௜ ൌ  ? ሺݑ ?ܯܴ௣௥௘௜ כ ݑ ?ܯܴݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ௜௝ כ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝ଶ௝ୀଵ ሻ 
 
Once again, the absolute deaths after the hypothetical change in expenditure must be calculated 
based upon the change in under-5 mortality rate resulting from the hypothetical change in 
expenditure.  The annual under-5 mortality rate after the change in expenditure ܣݑ ?ܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜ can be 
obtained using the estimated country specific elasticity: 
 
(11) ݑ ?ܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜ ൌ  ݑ ?ܯܴ௣௥௘௜ െ ሺݑ ?ܯܴ௣௥௘௜ כ ሺെ ? כ ݑ ?ܯܴ݈݁ܽݏݐ݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௜ሻ 
 
Thus the post-change constant annual mortality rate is then calculated as: 
 
(12) ܣݑ ?ܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜ ൌ െ ሺሺ ? െ  ?௣௢௦௧௜ሻȀ ? ? ? ?ሻȀ ? 
 
These are again weighted so that the number of deaths in each age category after the change in 
expenditure is calculated as: 
 
(13) ݑ ?݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௣௢௦௧௜ ൌ ሺ ? ܣݑ ?ܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜௝ כ ݑ ?ܯܴݓ݄݁݅݃ݐ௜௝ כ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝ሻଶ௝ୀଵ  
 
Subtracting deaths post-change from deaths pre-change in the 0-1 and 1-4 age categories gives lives 
saved in each, and summing across these two age categories gives total lives saved. 
 
(14) ݑ ?݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁ ௜݀ ൌ ݑ ?݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௣௥௘௜ െ ݑ ?݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௣௢௦௧௜ 
 
Total lives saved (i.e., deaths averted) by the change in expenditure among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds 
are thus: 
 
(15) ݈݅ݒ݁ݏݏܽݒ݁݀ ? െ  ?Ƭ ? ?െ  ? ?௜ ൌ  ݑ ?݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁ ௜݀ ൅ ܽ݀ݑ݈ݐ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ 
 
Equations (1) through (15) are calculated for each country i.  Thus the number of deaths averted in 
each country depends upon ƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?mortality elasticities of public expenditure on health, 
baseline mortality rates and the ĂŐĞĂŶĚŐĞŶĚĞƌƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŽĨĞĂĐŚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?For 
example, Bolivia and Sierra Leone have very similar elasticities (-0.177 for adult female mortality and 
-0.180 for adult male mortality in both countries and 0.507 for under-5 mortality for Bolivia and -
0.506 for under-5 mortality for Sierra Leone).  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?^ŝĞƌƌĂ>ĞŽŶĞ ?ƐďĂƐĞůŝŶĞŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇƌĂƚĞƐĂƌĞ
more than double those of Bolivia for all three age categories, so more lives are saved among 0-5 
and 15-60 year olds in Sierra Leone.  Cost per life saved depends not only on how many lives saved, 
but also upon baseline public expenditure on health per capita.  Bolivia spends more than 5 times as 
much on health than Sierra Leone per capita, and as such a 1% change in spending constitutes a far 
greater amount in Bolivia than in Sierra Leone.  This furthers the difference in cost per death averted 
between the two countries. 
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Although cost per death averted is interesting, it is not reported here for two reasons.  First, the 
number of deaths averted in each country is only useful for our purposes insofar as it can be used to 
calculate the survival effects of changes in expenditure, which constitute one part of DALYs.  Second, 
the true cost per death averted is likely to be lower than what would be calculated from the above 
series of equations as it is reasonable to expect that changes in public expenditure on health affect 
mortality outside the 0-5 and 15-60 age groups.  These issues are dealt with in the following section 
on the survival effects of changes in expenditure. 
 
2.2 What are the survival effects of changes in expenditure? 
To get closer to determining how changes in public expenditure on health affect a summary measure 
of mortality and morbidity (i.e., DALYs in this instance), we need to use information about the 
number of deaths that are averted as a result of changes in expenditure to calculate how many years 
of life that are not lost as a result.  This gives us an estimate of YLLs averted, which when added to 
an estimate of years of life lost (YLDs) averted, a measure of morbidity, gives an estimate of the 
effect of changes in public expenditure on health on DALYs. 
 
(16) ܦܣܮ ௜ܻ ൌ ܻܮܮ௜ ൅ ܻܮܦ௜ 
 
The effect of changes in public expenditure on YLLs can be obtained in two possible ways given the 
model and dataset used by Bokhari et al (2007).  First, YLLs averted due to changes in expenditure 
can be calculated by combining information on the mortality effects of expenditure by age and 
gender from section 2.1 with information about conditional life expectancy (CLE) also by age and 
gender.  However, as total YLLs for each country can themselves be calculated, we can also directly 
estimate the effect of changes in expenditure on YLLs.  Each way of getting at the survival effects of 
changes in expenditure is explained in the two subsections that follow, and the associated 
assumptions are also explored. 
2.2.1 Indirectly estimating effects on survival from mortality 
The information from section 2.1 about the effect of a change in public expenditure on health on 
mortality (and therefore deaths averted) among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds can be used to calculate 
YLLs averted due to a change in public expenditure on health.  We need to know two things in order 
to make this calculation: 
 
1) YLLs associated with each averted death 
2) YLLs averted among individuals ages 6-14 and 61+ 
 
The first ? the number of YLLs associated with each death averted by a change in spending ?
depends upon the age at which each death is averted, as well as the gender of the individual and the 
country that they live in.  We can apply country, gender and age-group-specific CLE to deaths 
averted among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds by five-year age-group calculated in the previous section.  
Summing the YLLs associated with each death averted among individuals aged 0-5 and 15-60 gives 
total YLLs averted among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds. 
 
(17) ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ܽ݃݁ݏ ? െ  ?Ƭ ? ?െ  ? ?௜ ൌ   ? ൫ܥܮܧ௜௝ כଶ௝ୀଵݑ ?݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁ ௜݀௝൯ ൅  ?  ? ሺܥܮܧ௜௝௚ כ ݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜௝௚ሻଽ௝ୀଵଶ௚ୀଵ  
 
In countries where 0-5 and 15-60 year olds account for a larger proportion of the total population, 
YLLs averted as a result of an increase in public expenditure on health will appear larger than in 
countries where these age groups make up a smaller proportion of the total population.  This is 
particularly evident in countries where children under 5 comprise a relatively large share of the total 
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population for two reasons.  First, CLE is higher among 0-5 year olds than any age between 15 and 
60.  Second, the elasticity on mortality in this group is generally greater in magnitude than the 
elasticities for adult female and adult male mortality. 
 
Using CLE assumes that deaths averted are returned to the morality risk of the general population 
matched for age and gender.  This is likely to be optimistic with regard to survival effects as those 
individuals who have died are more likely to have comorbidities, and so averting their deaths may 
not necessarily restore them to the same morbidity level as the average living population.  CLE is 
obtained from the Global Burden of Disease and is available only by five-year age category. 
 
While equation 17 provides an estimate of the YLLs averted among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds based on 
mortality effects, we expect this to be an underestimate of total YLLs averted as it does not account 
for the potential effect of a change in expenditure on other age groups.  One option would be to 
assume no effect on those other groups since this is not reported in the data, but this would be an 
extreme assumption.  A more reasonable assumption is that the effect on YLLs among the total 
population is proportional to the estimated effect on YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds according 
to the baseline levels of YLLs in those age groups compared to the total population. 
 
To apply this assumption we need to know the total YLLs that exist in a given country and those that 
exist among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds specifically.  In our case YLLs represent the gap between age at 
death and the conditional life expectancy.12  As such, total population YLLs are calculated for each 
country as the product of country-specific absolute numbers of deaths (from GBD data) and CLE by 
gender in each of 18 age categories comprised of ages 0-1, 80+ and sixteen five-year age categories 
covering ages 5-79 (also from GBD data).  Summing across age categories and genders gives the total 
YLLs for each country. 
 
(18) ܻܮܮ௜ ൌ   ? ൫ܥܮܧ௜௝ כ ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜௝൯ଵ଼௝ୀଵ  
 
YLLs for 0-5 and 15-60 year olds are calculated as: 
 
(19) ܻܮܮǡ ܽ݃݁ݏ ? െ  ?Ƭ ? ?െ  ? ?௜ ൌ   ? ൫ܥܮܧ௜௝ כ ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ܽݐ݄ݏ௜௝൯ଵଵ௝ୀଵ  
 
Thus the ratio of YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds to YLLs for total population can be expressed as 
follows. 13 
 
(20) ߪ௜ ൌ ௒௅௅ǡ௔௚௘௦଴ିହƬଵହି଺଴೔௒௅௅ǡ௔௟௟௔௚௘௦೔  
 
To apply the assumption that the effect on YLLs among the total population is proportional to the 
estimated effect on YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds, we simply scale up YLLs averted based on 
mortality effects using the ratio from (20):  
 
(21)
 ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܽ݊݀ݎܽݐ݅݋ܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ݈݈ܽܽ݃݁ݏ௜ ൌሺ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ܽ݃݁ݏ ? െ  ?Ƭ ? ?െ  ? ?௜ሻȀߪ௜ 
 
                                                          
12
 Consistent with the YLLs calculated by World Health Organization age-weighting and time discounting are not used.  YLLs 
calculated by WHO use a projected frontier life expectancy at birth for 2050 of 92 years instead of conditional life 
expectancy. 
13
 For middle-income countries mean=68%; min=37%; max=93%.  For low-income countries mean=84%; min=49%; 
max=93%.  
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This assumes that the effect of health care on YLLs is distributed in proportion to the distribution of 
YLLs itself across age groups.  Specifically, we assume that the proportion of YLLs averted of all YLLs 
in the 0-5 and 15-60 year olds is the same as in the total population.  While this is generally a 
reasonable assumption, one could argue that an increase in public expenditure on health does not 
affect adolescents (i.e., 6-14 year olds) or older individuals (i.e., 60+ year olds) in the same way that 
it affects young children or the working age population.  This may be the case, for example, if an 
increase in public expenditure on health is aimed toward interventions that affect under-5 mortality 
as it might be in a country working toward meeting the Millennium Development Goal to reduce 
child mortality that was set forth in 2000. However, the assumption may be considered more 
reasonable than assuming that health care expenditure does not affect mortality among adolescents 
and older individuals and is arguably the better option given data constraints. 
 
2.2.2 Directly estimating effects on survival 
The effect of changes in expenditure on survival can also be directly estimated by estimating the 
effect on population YLLs directly by employing YLL per capita as the outcome variable in the 
econometric model to generate YLL elasticities. 
 
(22) ݌ܿܻܮܮ௜ ൌ ܻܮܮ௜Ȁ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜ 
 
YLLs used are those calculated in equation 18.  Directly estimating the effect on YLLs negates the 
need to use estimates of the mortality effect to calculate YLLs and also the need for the assumption 
that the effect on YLLs among the total population is proportional to the estimated effect on YLLs 
among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds.  Using the same econometric model as described earlier for 
estimating the effect of expenditures on mortality, country-level YLL per capita elasticities of public 
expenditure on health were estimated.  The range of estimated elasticities among LMICs was -0.26  W 
-0.30 with a mean value of -0.30.14  
 
Cost per YLL averted is generally higher when it is based on mortality estimates, suggesting that the 
assumption of proportionality between YLLs averted among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds and those 
averted among the rest of the population underestimates total YLLs averted if direct estimation 
results in an estimate that is closer to the truth.  Nonetheless, because the differences are small, 
where data on YLLs is unavailable basing cost per YLL averted on mortality effects would suffice, 
although this evidence suggests this may be optimistic. 
 
2.3 What are the morbidity effects of changes in expenditure? 
Changes in spending will likely affect morbidity (i.e., YLDs) as well as mortality.  Having estimated the 
survival effects of changes in public expenditure on YLLs (using two methods: mortality based and 
direct estimation), we now consider the morbidity effects of changes in expenditure.  Public 
expenditure on health can affect population level morbidity directly and indirectly. 
 
The indirect effect of expenditure arises through changes in survival.  We would not expect an 
individual whose death has been averted due to medical intervention to be in full health as deaths 
are generally the result of chronic or infectious diseases, which have an associated morbidity 
burden.  Exceptions may include deaths caused by accidents (e.g., motor vehicle), but are a small 
percent of preventable deaths and amenable mortality. 
                                                          
14
 In MICs the average elasticity on under-5 mortality is -0.33% (-0.27% to -0.36%), on adult female mortality is -0.18% (-
0.11% to -0.20%) and on adult male mortality is also -0.18% (-0.13% to -0.20%).  In LICs the average elasticity on under-5 
mortality is -0.33% (-0.25% to -0.35%), on adult female mortality is -0.17% (-0.08% to -0.19%) and on adult male mortality 
is also -0.18% (-0.10% to -0.20%). 
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Increases in public expenditure on health also affect morbidity directly through the prevention and 
treatment of disease.  For example, public health education campaigns and the distribution of 
condoms can help to prevent Hepatitis C.  It can be treated and even cured with antiviral 
medication, but untreated can result in cirrhosis, liver cancer, liver failure and death.  Increases in 
expenditure may result in decreased incidence of the disease and/or increased access to treatment, 
contributing to a reduction in population level burden of this disease, and through the same 
mechanisms other diseases.  
 
There are three ways to get at the effect of changes in public expenditure on morbidity: 
 
1) Using either survival effect a or b as a surrogate for morbidity effects and 
incorporating an indirect effect: 
a. mortality-based survival effects 
b. directly estimated survival effects 
2) Directly estimating the effects of changes in public expenditure on health on YLDs 
averted 
 
Each of these is outlined below with a description of what they capture (the direct or indirect 
effects) and the assumptions associated with each. 
2.3.1 Indirectly estimating effects on morbidity from survival effects 
When it is only possible to estimate the effect of changes in expenditure on mortality outcomes 
assumptions are required to move from the mortality to survival to the disability effects of 
expenditure.  While one possibility is to assume that changes in expenditure only affect mortality 
and not morbidity, this is an extreme assumption.  More likely, the effect on morbidity is 
proportional to the effect on survival.  This relies on the assumption that the effect of changes in 
expenditure on YLL (as measured by mortality based estimates) is a surrogate for the effect on YLD 
and that the elasticity of the effect of a change in expenditure on YLD is similar to the elasticity of 
the effect of a change in expenditure on YLL.  To implement this assumption we need to know the 
ratio of total YLDs in a given country to total YLLs in that country.  For this we rely on WHO published 
estimates of YLD by country and YLL from (18).  The ratio is expressed as: 
 
(23) ߛ௜ ൌ ௒௅஽೔௒௅௅೔  
 
All ratios ߛ for LMICs are below 100% indicating that more than half of the overall survival and 
morbidity burden in these countries is comprised of mortality.15  This is neither obviously over- or 
under-optimistic with regard to health effects, but could be seen as optimistic if we think 
governments proportionally put greater priority on averting mortality than disability in LMICs.  We 
can examine this through comparison with the other two ways of directly estimating these effects.  
YLDs averted for the population can thus be calculated from either indirectly obtained YLLs averted 
based on mortality estimates or directly estimated YLL averted (both represented by ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ݈݈ܽܽ݃݁ݏ௜): 
 
(24) ݎܽݐ݅݋ܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܦܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ ൌ ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ݈݈ܽܽ݃݁ݏ௜ כߛ௜  
 
Where it is possible to estimate the effect of changes in public expenditure on health on survival 
directly, as can be done in this scenario, ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ݈݈ܽܽ݃݁ݏ௜ in equation (24) can also be from 
directly estimated YLL averted.  However, whether mortality effects or directly estimated YLLs 
                                                          
15
 The mean ratio for middle-income countries is 1:0.61 with a range of 1:0.20 to 1:0.98.  The mean ratio for low-income 
countries is 1:0.31 with a range of 1:0.14 to 1:0.75. 
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averted are used as a surrogate for morbidity effects, only the direct effect of changes in public 
expenditure on health on morbidity is captured.  As such, we are implicitly assuming that each YLL 
averted is lived in full health, which we know is unlikely.  WHO publishes country-level data on YLDs, 
providing an estimate of average population health per capita, which is calculated as: 
 
(25) ݌݁ݎܿܽ݌݅ݐܽܻܮܦ௜ ൌ ሺ ? ሺ ௜ܲௗ כ ܦ ௗܹሻሻȀ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௡ௗୀଵ  
 
where ௜ܲௗis the prevalence of disease d in country i, ܦ ௗܹ is the disability weight associated with 
disease d and there are n diseases.16  The disability weights reflect disease severity and are bounded 
between 0 (no morbidity) and 1 (death) (GHDx 2014).17,18  
 
Given the country level average morbidity burden is non-zero, it is unlikely that the indirect effect of 
spending on morbidity through YLLs averted is non-zero.  To account for the fact that YLLs averted 
will not be lived in full health we can apply country specific per capita YLD burden to the country 
specific change in YLL (whether YLL averted is calculated indirectly from mortality estimates or 
estimated directly from YLL). 
 
(26) ݅݊݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݂݂݁݁ܿݐܻܮܦ௜ ൌ ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ݈݈ܽܽ݃݁ݏ௜ כ ሺ ? െ݌ܿܻܮܦ௜ሻ  
 
Adjusting YLDs averted to reflect the disability in which those life years are on average likely to be 
lived results in slightly higher costs per YLD averted as it reduces total YLD calculated to be averted 
by the change in public expenditure on health. 
 
(27) ܻܮܦܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ ൌ ݎܽݐ݅݋ܾܽݏ݁݀ܻܮܦܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ௜െ ݅݊݀݅ݎ݁ܿݐ݂݂݁݁ܿݐܻܮܦ௜ 
2.3.2 Directly estimating effects on morbidity 
YLD data (like YLL) are available for 2000, so the effect of changes in expenditure on YLDs can be 
estimated directly.  Estimating this directly enables us to capture both channels through which 
changes in expenditure affect YLDs: through increases in YLDs from YLLs averted and decreases in 
YLDs from changes in expenditure, resulting in a net effect.  Using the Bokhari et al. (2007) 
econometric model described earlier and estimating the country-level YLD per capita elasticities of 
public expenditure on health, the range of estimated elasticities among LMICs was -0.02% to -0.06% 
with a mean value of -0.03%.19  The per capita YLD burden following the change in expenditure is 
determined as: 
 
(28)  ݌ܿܻܮܦ௣௢௦௧௜ ൌ ݌ܿܻܮܦ௣௥௘೔ െ ݌ܿܻܮܦ௣௥௘೔ כ ሺെ ? כ ܻܮܦ݈݁ܽݏݐ݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௜ሻ 
 
YLDs averted by the change in expenditure are thus the difference between per capita YLD burden 
before and after the change in expenditure, multiplied by the population: 
 
(29) ܻܮܦܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ ൌ ሺ݌ܿܻܮܦ௣௥௘೔ െ ݌ܿܻܮܦ௣௢௦௧௜ሻ כ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
 
                                                          
16
 YLDs are calculated from prevalence estimates that draw upon the Global Burden of Disease 2010 analysis, and are also 
adjusted for independent comorbidity.  They are disaggregated by age and gender for countries for the year 2000.  Age-
weighting and time discounting are not used. 
17
 Disability weights come from the Global Burden of Disease study (2010) and are developed through surveys of the 
general public. 
18
 Although it is conceivable that countries with high disease prevalence and comorbidities could have per capita YLD 
values of greater than 1, this is not found to be the case.  Among LICs (MICs) mean per capita YLD is 0.108 (0.106), with a 
range of 0.087 to 0.124 (0.082 to 0.138). 
19
 In low-income countries the mean elasticity on YLD is -0.00031 with a range of -0.0004 to -0.00027.  In middle-income 
countries the mean elasticity on YLD is -0.00031 with a range of -0.00064 to -0.00024. 
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Having two estimates of YLDs averted (based on survival and directly estimated) enables us to 
examine the assumptions used to move from estimates of survival to morbidity, and this is done 
later on in 2.5. 
 
2.4 Directly estimating the effect of changes in expenditure on disability and survival 
Given that we have data on both YLLs and YLDs by country for the year 2000 we are able to 
construct DALYs, which are a summary measure of overall population mortality and morbidity.  Each 
DALY represents one lost year of healthy life.  Baseline per capita DALYs for each country i were 
constructed as follows: 
 
(30) ݌ܿܦܣܮ ௣ܻ௥௘೔ ൌ ݌ܿܻܮܮ௜ ൅ ݌ܿܻܮܦ௜ 
 
where per capita YLL are calculated in equation 22 and per capita YLD are calculated in equation 25.  
The average elasticity for LICs is -0.21 (range -0.20 to -0.21) and for MICs is -0.21 (range -0.18 to -
0.21).  The country-specific elasticities are used to determine the change in DALYs per capita at the 
country level. 
 
(31)  ݌ܿܦܣܮ ௣ܻ௢௦௧௜ ൌ ݌ܿܦܣܮ ௣ܻ௥௘೔ െ ݌ܿܦܣܮ ௣ܻ௥௘೔ כ ሺെ ? כ ܦܣܮܻ݈݁ܽݏݐ݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௜ሻ 
 
This, in turn, is used to calculate overall DALYs averted in each country. 
 
(32) ܦܣܮܻܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ ൌ ሺ݌ܿܦܣܮ ௣ܻ௥௘೔ െ ݌ܿܦܣܮ ௣ܻ௢௦௧௜ሻ כ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
 
This results in an average of 42,327 DALYs averted (range 503 to 864,175) in LICs and 25,159 (range 
142 to 611,165) in MICs. 
 
2.5 Estimates of cost per DALY averted thresholds 
In sections 2.1 through 2.3 we presented a number of different ways of calculating YLLs and YLDs 
averted, ultimately leading to the direct estimation and calculation of DALYs averted in section 2.4.  
As DALYs are the sum of YLLs and YLDs there are four different ways of estimating DALYs averted 
that account for the effect of changes in expenditure on YLLs averted as well as both the direct and 
indirect effects on YLDs averted.  These are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Different methods for estimating and calculating DALYs averted from Bokhari et al (2007) 
  
1 2 3 4 
YLL averted 
 
Based on 
indirectly 
estimating 
effects on 
survival from 
mortality 
Directly 
estimated 
Directly 
estimated 
Directly 
estimated 
YLD averted 
Direct 
effect 
Uses indirectly 
estimated 
effects on 
survival from 
mortality as a 
surrogate for 
morbidity 
effects 
Uses directly 
estimated 
survival effects 
as a surrogate 
for morbidity 
effects 
Directly 
estimated 
Indirect 
effect 
Uses average 
overall 
population 
health as a 
surrogate for 
increase in YLD 
burden 
associated with 
increase in YLLs 
averted 
Uses average 
overall 
population 
health as a 
surrogate for 
increase in YLD 
burden 
associated with 
increase in YLLs 
averted 
 
The estimates of DALY averted are then used to calculate cost per DALY averted as: 
 
(33) ܿ݋ݏݐ݌݁ݎܦܣܮܻܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ ൌ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?כ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ݌ݑܾ݈݅ܿ݁ݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁݋݊݄݈݁ܽݐ݄௜ሻȀܦܣܮܻݏܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀௜ 
 
2.5.1 Low-income countries 
Estimates of cost per DALY averted for the 53 LICs in Bokhari et al (2007) ?ƐĚĂƚĂƐĞƚall lie below the 1-
3x GDP per capita rule of thumb commonly used in recommending the adoption of new 
interventions in LMICs.20 (see Figure 1.)  These results imply that even interventions adopted on the 
basis of being  “highly cost-effective ? at less than 1x GDP per capita displace more health than they 
generate if their cost per DALY averted is above the range of estimates provided here. 
                                                          
20
 Countries are classified according to the year 2000 World Bank income classifications. 
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Figure 1. Cost per DALY averted estimates for low-income countries from Chapter 2
21
 
 
The range of estimates for each country based on the input parameter estimates from Bokhari et al. 
(2007) enables us to compare 1) indirectly estimated effects on survival from mortality to directly 
estimated effects on survival and 2) indirectly estimated effects on morbidity from survival effects to 
directly estimated effects on morbidity.  These comparisons allow us to make judgements about the 
assumptions used, which become important when using surrogacy assumptions in Chapter 3.  
Finally, we consider 3) whether there are any outliers, and what we can learn from them. 
  
In order to make the first comparison, indirectly estimated effects on survival from mortality to 
directly estimated effects on survival, we can look at cost per DALY averted from DALYs 1 and 2.  The 
difference between the two originates from how YLLs averted are estimated as both use YLLs 
averted as a surrogate for direct morbidity effects and average overall population health as a 
surrogate for indirect morbidity effects.  In DALY 1 YLLs averted are based on mortality estimates 
and in DALY 2 they are directly estimated.  DALY 2 gives the lowest cost per DALY averted estimate 
for 83% of countries, while DALY 1 gives the lowest for the other 17%.  Indeed, more YLLs are 
estimated to be averted when YLLs are directly estimated (the same 83% of countries) as opposed to 
based on mortality effects.  This suggests that basing YLLs averted on mortality effects results in an 
underestimate of YLLs averted and thus an overestimate of cost per DALY averted for most LICs. 
 
To make the second comparison, indirectly estimated effects on morbidity from survival effects 
against directly estimated effects on morbidity, we can consider how DALY 3 and DALY 2 differ.  YLLs 
                                                          
21
 Converted from 2000 international $, PPP using http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPPC.RF, downloaded 13 
November 2015. 
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averted from both are estimated directly, and the two differ only in how YLD averted are estimated.  
YLDs averted in DALY 3 are estimated directly, while in DALY 2 they are based on YLLs averted (i.e., 
directly estimated survival effects are used as a surrogate for morbidity effects).  Cost per DALY 
averted from DALY 2 is always lower than DALY 3 for LICs.  This results from the fact that on average, 
cost per YLD averted is highest when it is directly estimated.  This suggests that the assumptions we 
employed around either the direct or indirect effect of changes in public expenditure on morbidity 
are imperfect.  One reasonable explanation is that assuming that YLLs averted are lived out in 
average population morbidity is optimistic and they are likely lived in below average health.  It is also 
possible that the direct effect of spending on morbidity is lower than the effect of it has on survival.  
If the latter is true, using the surrogacy assumption will result in an overestimate of YLDs averted. 
 
Among the countries in the sample, the highest cost per DALY averted estimate is from either DALY 1 
(51% of the sample) or DALY 4 (47%), with one exception, Moldova, where DALY 3 generates the 
highest cost per DALY averted.  DALY 4 is generated by directly estimating the effect of changes in 
spending on per capita DALYs directly.  Why directly estimating DALYs averted results in fewer 
averted in most LICs (87%) than directly estimated YLLs and YLDs avertĞĚĂŶĚƐƵŵŵŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŝƐŶ ?ƚ
clear; however, the difference between cost per DALY averted from DALY 3 and 4 are very similar.  
Cost per DALY averted from DALY 4 is, on average among LICs in the sample, 12% higher than from 
DALY 3.  As such, that cost per DALY averted is highest from DALY 3 for Moldova is random. 
 
That DALY 1 results in the lowest cost per DALY averted for 17% of countries and the highest for 51% 
is, however, worth further exploration.  The 17% of LICs for which cost per DALY averted from DALY 
1 is the lowest estimate of cost per DALY averted are Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, and these are the 
same 9 LICs for which mortality based estimates of cost per YLLs averted were lower than directly 
estimated YLLs averted.  The number of mortality based YLLs averted between countries may differ 
for three main reasons. 
 
One possibility is that YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds make up a small proportion of the total 
population, and so when the effect of spending on mortality is scaled up to the full population we 
estimate far more lives saved than in other countries.  We find that this is not true for these 
countries.  In fact, Niger and Sierra Leone have the highest ratio of individuals in the 0-5 and 15-60 
age categories to total population.  0-5 and 15-60 year olds make up more than 92% of the total 
population in these countries.  If anything these countries tend toward having 0-5 and 15-60 years 
constitute a disproportionately large proportion of the population. 
 
A second possibility is that the elasticities on under-5, adult female and adult male mortality are 
higher in these countries than in other LICs.  However, as the elasticities are perfectly in line with the 
other LICs, with no obvious outliers, this is not the explanation we are after. 
 
A final possibility is that the mortality rates in these countries are much higher than in other 
countries, and indeed this plays the largest role in explaining why so many more YLLs are estimated 
to be averted in these countries when based on mortality effects.  In particular, Zimbabwe, Sierra 
>ĞŽŶĞ ?DĂůĂǁŝ ?ZǁĂŶĚĂ ?ŽƚĞĚ ?/ǀŽŝƌĞ ?EŝŐĞƌŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨƚŚĞŽŶŐŽĂůůŚĂǀĞ
adult male mortality rates of above 400 per 1,000, adult female mortality rates of above 350 per 
1,000 and under-5 mortality rates of above 145 per 1,000.  Lesotho suffers particularly high adult 
male and female mortality rates and Niger suffers from an especially high under-5 mortality rate of 
227 per 1,000 (the second highest among LICs after Sierra Leone).  As such, despite having very 
similar elasticities on these mortality rates to other LICs, when these elasticities are applied to the 
country specific mortality rate, far more lives are saved and thus YLLs averted than in other LICs with 
lower mortality rates. 
Cost per DALY averted thresholds for low- and middle-income countries: evidence from cross country data  19 
 
 
Thus, for some countries basing YLLs averted on mortality effects underestimates total YLLs averted, 
while for others it may result in an overestimate.  As such, it is not clear whether estimating YLLs 
directly is indeed a better measure, as it appears less sensitive to underlying mortality rates. 
 
2.5.2 Middle-income countries 
As shown in Figure 2, the range of cost per DALY averted estimates in middle-income countries 
crosses 1x GDP per capita for 21% of the 52 countries in this sample, but never reaches 3x GDP per 
capita.  On average, the minimum cost per DALY averted estimate is 43% of 1x GDP per capita 
(range: 11% to 100%).  For most middle-income countries, using a CET of 1x GDP per capita would 
lead to investment in interventions that displace more health than they generate. 
 
 
Figure 2. Cost per DALY averted estimates for middle-income countries from Chapter 2
22
 
 
The same general patterns are present in the cost per DALY averted estimates among middle-
income countries that allowed us to compare 1) indirectly estimated effects on survival from 
mortality to directly estimated effects on survival and 2) indirectly estimated effects on morbidity 
from survival effects to directly estimated effects on morbidity, among low-income countries in the 
previous section.  We also look at 3) whether there are any outliers, and what we can learn from 
them. 
                                                          
22
 Argentina was in the original Bokhari et al (2007) dataset, but was dropped from the graph as no PPP conversion data 
was available.  It is included in the Appendix.  Converted from 2000 international $, PPP using 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPPC.RF, downloaded 13 November 2015.  Equatorial Guinea was excluded 
as counter-intuitive sign of elasticity would make construction of a CET impossible. 
20  CHE Research Paper 122 
In order to make the first comparison for middle-income countries, we can look at cost per DALY 
averted from DALYs 1 and 2.  The lowest cost per DALY averted estimate was from DALY 2 for 98% of 
countries.23  This is similar to LICs, where DALY 2 was the lowest for 83% of countries.  As discussed 
in 2.5.1., DALY 1 and 2 differ from each other only in how YLLs averted are estimated, as they are 
estimated directly in DALY 2, but are based on mortality effects in DALY 1.  Just as in low-income 
countries, directly estimating YLLs averted results in more YLLs averted for every middle-income 
country with one exception.  Russia is the only middle-income country for which DALY 2 does not 
provide the lowest cost per DALY averted estimate, and this outlier is revisited later. 
 
To make the second comparison for middle-income countries (comparing indirectly estimated 
effects on morbidity from survival effects against directly estimated effects on morbidity) we 
consider how DALY 3 and DALY 2 differ for this set of countries.  The findings again mirror low-
income countries: cost per DALY averted from DALY 2 is always lower than DALY 3.  This strengthens 
the conclusion that the assumptions we employed around either the direct or indirect effect of 
changes in public expenditure on morbidity result in an overestimate of YLDs averted, thus leading 
to an underestimate of cost per DALY averted. 
 
Just as in low-income countries, cost per DALY averted from DALY 3 and 4 are similar.  Cost per DALY 
averted from DALY 3 is, on average among middle-income countries, 7% lower than from DALY 4. 
 
Costa Rica stands out in Figure 2 as the middle-income country with the highest estimate of cost per 
DALY averted from DALY 1.  Of all middle-ŝŶĐŽŵĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ŽƐƚĂZŝĐĂ ?Ɛ ?A?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƉƵďůŝĐ
expenditure on health per capita, whilst relatively high for its GDP per capita, generates the fewest 
DALYs averted per capita, owing to its baseline population distributions in terms of age and health. 
Since this is the denominator of the CET associated with DALY 1, it is understandably large in this 
sample of countries whĞŶǀŝĞǁĞĚǁŝƚŚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?dƐƌĂŶŬĞĚďǇ'WƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂ ? 
 
Russia is a less obvious outlier as the only middle-income country for which DALY 2 is not the lowest 
cost per DALY averted estimate.  As such, it presents an interesting case through which to better 
understand what drives each of the four estimates.  It has a high adult male mortality rate at 443 per 
1,000 as well as a high adult female mortality rate at 158 per 1,000, but a below median under-5 
mortality rate among countries in the sample.  However ?ƚŚĞĐŽƐƚƉĞƌ>zĂǀĞƌƚĞĚĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞĚƌŝǀĞŶ
by this aspect of YLLs averted alone as Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland all have 
higher mortality rates among all three age groups than Russia does.  It is instead the combination of 
two of the three factors driving YLLs averted in the LIC section above: mortality rates and the 
proportion of total population YLLs that YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds make up. 
 
YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds make up a very high percentage of total YLLs in Botswana, 
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland (87-93%), whereas in Russia YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year 
olds make up 57% of total YLLs.  Thus when CLE is applied to the estimates of deaths averted, a large 
number of YLLs averted among adults in Russia results, and when YLLs are scaled up to be for the 
whole population this is carried through.  Interestingly, basing YLLs averted on mortality effects 
results in a similar number of YLLs estimated to be averted compared to when YLLs averted are 
estimated directly (117,000 compared to 114,000 respectively). 
 
Indeed, when using DALY 1 we find 161,000 DALYs averted compared to 157,000 in DALY 2 and 
120,000 in DALY 3.  That DALYs averted from DALY 1 and 2 are close is no surprise given how close 
                                                          
23
 There is no data on YLLs, YLDs or DALYs for Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia or St. Vincent and the Grenadines.  As 
ƐƵĐŚ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶŽŬŚĂƌŝĞƚĂů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚĂƚĂƐĞƚ ?ǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚŐĞƚĂŶǇĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĐŽƐƚƉĞƌůŝĨĞ
saved among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds (as the ratio of YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds to YLLs in the total population is 
necessary), and so no results are reported for these countries. 
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the estimates of YLLs averted were, and that YLDs averted depend on YLLs averted for these two 
versions of DALYs.  However, that estimated DALYs averted for DALY 3 is so much lower than DALY 1 
or 2 makes clear how few YLDs are estimated to be averted when YLDs averted are directly 
estimated.  Indeed, fewer than 6,000 are estimated to be averted in Russia when directly estimated. 
 
The results of the four alternative approaches to calculating cost per DALY averted are presented in 
the Appendix for all countries where cost is measured in year 2000 international $. 
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3. Estimates based on panel data 
Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) use a panel of 148 countries between 1995 and 2008 to investigate 
the effect of various types of health care expenditure on under-5 mortality, adult male mortality and 
adult female mortality.24  Given the challenges associated with finding a suitable IV for health care 
expenditure, they instead implement the IV approach used by Brückner (2013) meaning that they 
use an IV to instrument the health outcomes rather than the health care expenditure and then 
explicitly account for the inherent reverse causality.  In addition, a fixed effects specification is used 
to control for heterogeneity between countries.  Unlike the Bokhari et al. (2007) model, where all 
variables are log-transformed prior to estimation, the Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) model are 
estimated using raw values of variables and as such interpretation of regression coefficients is 
different. Instead of being interpreted as an elasticity, the reported results should be interpreted as 
estimates of deaths averted per 1,000 for an additional $100 public expenditure on health per 
capita. 
 
In their main model, the effect of public expenditure on health per capita on deaths per 1,000 is 
assumed to be constant across all countries.  As such there are no interaction terms employed in 
their main model.  In order to detect some non-linearities of the effect of public expenditure on 
health on mortality outcomes with respect to GDP per capita, Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) 
implement a model where the public expenditure on health variable is interacted with LMIC status.  
The relevant effects of public expenditure on health on mortality outcomes for LMICs in each model 
are reported below. 
 
Table 3. Estimates of deaths averted per 1,000 population for an additional $100 public expenditure on 
health per capita (adapted from: Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015)) 
 Under-5 mortality Adult female mortality Adult male mortality 
Effect for all countries in 
main model 
-13.193 -2.583 -2.210 
Effect for LMICs in 
interacted model 
-90.772 -18.414 -12.004 
 
No further outcomes are estimated using the Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) model since it uses 
panel data and cannot be used to directly estimate effects on YLL per capita, YLD per capita or DALY 
per capita that are not available on a year-by-year basis.  Therefore the corresponding CETs are 
derived using modelling assumptions to extrapolate beyond mortality effects of changes in 
expenditure.  These are described in the sections below, and comparison is drawn between these 
results and those obtained in Chapter 2 throughout. 
 
3.1 What are the mortality effects of changes in expenditure? 
This estimated effect of a $100 increase in government expenditure per capita on mortality25 among 
children under-5, adult males and adult females from Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) can be 
translated into a proportional change in the average mortality rate (across the years 1995-2008) in 
each of the three groups ݃ by dividing the absolute value of the coefficient for each group by the 
average mortality rate for that group within Moreno-^ĞƌƌĂĂŶĚ^ŵŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƐĂŵƉůĞŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ
                                                          
24
 LMICs that are included in Moreno-^ĞƌƌĂĂŶĚ^ŵŝƚŚ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ? ? ? ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŐƵƌĞs in the 
sections that follow are those that are not included in the Bokhari et al (2007) analysis and for which, therefore, there is 
not information from which to draw ratios necessary to estimate all of the possible DALY figures. 
25
 Consistent with Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015), mortality rates are the average across the years included in the sample 
for each country. 
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from 1995 to 2008.26  Dividing the resulting value by 100 gives the effect per dollar increase per 
capita (instead of per hundred dollars). 
 
(34) ݌௚ ൌ ห௖௢௘௙௙௜௖௜௘௡௧೒ห௔௩௘௥௔௚௘ெோ೒ Ȁ ? ? ? 
 
The average mortality rate for adults represents the cumulative probability of death by age 60 
conditional on being alive at age 15 and these data, like that from Bokhari et al (2007), come from 
the World Bank.  The mortality rates for children under-5 are obtained from Institute for Health 
Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) and represent the cumulative mortality rate for the first five years of 
life. 
 
Table 4. Proportional effects of a $1 increase in government expenditure on health 
    
 
children under  
age 5 
adult females aged 15-
60 
adult males aged 15-
60 
% change in mortality 
rate ࢖ࢍ 1.43% 0.07% 0.06% 
 
The calculated proportional effect for each group ݌௚ can be applied to the average mortality rates of 
individual countries to obtain country specific effects.  For each country and group, therefore, the 
proportional change in mortality resulting from a $1 increase per capita in government spending 
reduces the mortality rate among children under 5, adult females and adult males by 1.43%, 0.07% 
and 0.06% respectively.  To determine the number of lives saved among adult males and adult 
females resulting from the hypothetical change in spending we first determine the pre-change 
annual mortality rate ܣܯܴ௣௥௘೔೒  from the mortality rate provided by the World Bank for either group ݃ of males or females in country ݅ using equation (1) from section 2.27  (We again assume at first an 
annual constant probability over 45 years, and divide by 1,000 as the mortality rates are expressed 
as per 1,000.)  As we know the risk of death is not constant between ages 15 and 60, we obtain five-
year age specific mortality rates by weighting the constant annual mortality rates calculated by (33) 
by known mortality rates, which were calculated in (2).28  The absolute baseline number of deaths 
among adult males or adults females can then be calculated by equation (3).  The mortality rate 
after the hypothetical change in spend for country i and age group ݃ is determined by: 
 
(35) ܯܴ௣௢௦௧௜௚ ൌ ൫ ? െ ݌௚൯ כ ܯܴ௣௥௘௜೒  
 
This corresponds to equation (4) in Chapter 2, but here we are using the proportional effect 
calculated in (34) instead of a country specific elasticity as was done in Chapter 2.  This is converted 
into an annual rate using equation 5.  The constant rates are then weighted using the weights from 
(2) again, and the absolute number of deaths following the change in spend is calculated by equation 
(6).  The number of deaths calculated among adults is then calculated by equation (7). 
 
For under-5 mortality, although the data source used by Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) is different 
to that used by Bokhari et al (2007), we can still apply the same set of calculations to get at deaths 
averted in children under-5 from a hypothetical change in government expenditure on health.  We 
                                                          
26
 It must be transformed into a proportional effect instead of used directly because the outcome variables estimated by 
Moreno-Serra and Smith are not logged. 
27
 We use the mortality rate used by Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015), which is the average mortality rate in a given age 
group in a given country across the years 1995-2008. 
28
 We are using the year 2000 rates as these most closely correspond to the average between 1995 and 2008 that is 
available in public data. 
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use equations (8) through (14), but replace equation (11) with corresponding version of equation 
(35). 
 
Any difference in calculated cost per deaths averted among adults between section 2.1 and this 
section will arise due to the different datasets, estimation methods as described earlier in the paper 
and the difference in baseline mortality rates (i.e., in 2000 versus on average between 1995 and 
2008).  Although the same outcome measure is used by both Bokhari et al (2007) and Moreno-Serra 
and Smith (2015) for adults, Bokhari et al (2007) use a cross-section from 2000 while Moreno-Serra 
and Smith (2015) use panel data from 1995-2008.  Among children under-5 differences in the 
hypothetical cost per deaths averted will arise for the same reasons as for adults, but additional 
differences may also be due to the different datasets used for this variable.29 
 
3.2 What are the survival effects of changes in expenditure? 
As the model employed by Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) requires panel data, we cannot estimate 
the effect of changes in government expenditure on survival directly.  The data used to construct 
YLLs (conditional life expectancy and mortality rates) from GBD are only available at 10 year 
intervals.  While it is conceivable that a panel could be constructed using this data and annual data 
on the cumulative probability of death for individuals aged 0-5 and 15-60 available from the World 
Bank, doing so would require a number of assumptions with regard to, for example, if and how 
conditional life expectancies change between decades, that would render the data subject to 
additional assumptions and uncertainty.  Additionally, lack of natural variation in conditional life 
expectancies between years would limit the variation in YLL to the variation in mortality in the 0-5 
and 15-60 age categories only.  Instead, we rely on what we learn from the effect of changes in 
expenditure on mortality.  There are two ways that we can calculate the survival effects of changes 
in expenditure using what we know about the mortality effects. 
 
1) Based on the estimated mortality effects of expenditure 
2) Based on what we know from estimating YLLs averted from section 2.2 
 
Each will be described below. 
 
3.2.1 Indirectly estimating effects on survival from mortality 
The same as in section 2.2, YLLs averted by the change in expenditure depends upon the age at 
which each life saved is saved, the gender of the individual and the country that they live in.  
Country, gender and age-specific CLE for year 2000 is applied to each life saved (i.e., death averted) 
among individuals aged 0-5 and 15-60 to determine YLL averted in this population using equation 17 
from section 2.2.  The same assumption applies: that individuals return to the country-specific 
mortality risk of the general population (matched for age and gender), and is likely to be optimistic 
ǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽůŝĨĞǇĞĂƌĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚŝƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞŽĨz>>ĂǀĞƌƚĞĚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
effect that expenditure has on individuals within the population who do not fall into the 0-5 and 15-
60 year age categories.  As discussed earlier in this paper, assuming that expenditure affects only 0-5 
and 15-60 year olds would be an extreme assumption, and instead we make a less strong 
assumption ? that the effect on YLLs among 6-14 and 61+ year olds is proportional to the estimated 
effect on YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds.  Further details on how this assumption is 
implemented are available in section 2.2.  This is calculated using equation (21), which relies on the 
ratio of YLLs among 0-5 and 15-60 year olds to YLLs among the total population from equation (20). 
                                                          
29
 Under-5 mortality rates from the World Bank are estimates developed by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality 
Estimation (UNICEF, WHO, World Bank, UN DESA Population Division.  More information on the estimation method is 
available at http://www.ploscollections.org/article/browseIssue.action?issue=info:doi/10.1371/issue.pcol.v07.i19.  More 
information on the method used by IHME is available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(10)60703-9/abstract. 
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3.2.2 Adjusting for directly estimated effects on survival 
Although we cannot estimate the effect of expenditure on YLLs directly using Moreno-Serra and 
Smith (2015), we can still use what we know about the effect of expenditure on YLLs from what was 
estimated in section  ? ? ?ƵƐŝŶŐŽŬŚĂƌŝĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐŵŽĚĞů ?DŽƌĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ǁĞĐĂŶĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚ
the ratio between directly estimated YLLs averted and calculated YLLs averted from mortality 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐƵƐŝŶŐŽŬŚĂƌŝĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐŵŽĚĞůĂŶĚĚĂƚĂǁŽƵůĚďĞsimilar.  That ratio is calculated as: 
 
(36) ߠ௜ ൌ ௗ௜௥௘௖௧௟௬௘௦௧௜௠௔௧௘ௗ௒௅௅௦௔௩௘௥௧௘ௗ೔௠௢௥௧௔௟௜௧௬௕௔௦௘ௗ௒௅௅௦௔௩௘௥௧௘ௗǡ௔௟௟௔௚௘௦೔ 
 
The numerator is calculated in second part of section 2.2.2 (directly estimating the effect of changes 
in expenditure on survival) and the denominator is calculated by equation (21).  Multiplying ߠ௜ by 
scaled up YLLs averted based on estimated mortality effects from section 3.2 gives an estimate of 
the YLLs we would expect to be estimated to be averted if we were able to estimate YLLs averted 
directly, assuming the relationship between direct estimation of YLLs averted and calculated scaled 
up YLLs averted is the same as it was ǁŚĞŶŽŬŚĂƌŝĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐŵŽĚĞůĂŶĚĚĂƚĂǁĞƌĞƵƐĞĚ ? 
 
(37) ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ݈݈ܽܽ݃݁ݏ ൌ ߠ௜ כ ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ݈݈ܽܽ݃݁ݏ௜ 
 
Consistent with Chapter 2, average cost per YLL averted was generally ůŽǁĞƌǁŚĞŶŝƚǁĂƐ “ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŽߠ௜ was applied) than when it was based on scaled up mortality effects. 
 
In MICs the cost per YLL averted is higher on average (whether mortality or direct estimation based) 
when using the model and data (with the addition of adult female and male mortality) of Bokhari et 
al (2007) than Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015).  However, in LICs the opposite is true, with cost per 
YLL being higher on average when based on Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015).  (See Table 530.) 
 
Table 5. Cost per YLL averted 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
MICs AVERAGE  $         7,474   $      4,516   $       2,628   $      1,653  
  MAX  $       32,126   $     13,480   $       6,761   $      3,662  
  MIN  $         1,025   $         829   $           684   $        401  
LICs AVERAGE  $            585   $         405   $           816   $        582  
  MAX  $         3,396   $      2,489   $       3,057  $      2,680  
  MIN  $               20   $           22   $           146   $        149  
 
(1) Estimated in Section 2.2.1 
   (2) Estimated in Section 2.2.2 
   (3) Estimated in Section 3.2.1 
   (4) Estimated in Section 3.2.2 
    
Cost per YLL averted for each country is based on the following three core issues, each of which 
differ depending upon whether the Bokhari et al (2007) or the Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) 
model and dataset are used: 
 
                                                          
30
 Only the mortality based estimates of cost per YLL averted can be calculated for Bahrain, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Fiji, 
Iran, Iraq, Latvia, Maldives, Malta, Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Suriname, Syria, Bhutan, Central African Republic, Laos, 
Liberia, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste as there are no ratios from section 2 for these.  They are therefore not included in 
the estimations of the averages. 
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1. Econometric estimates (i.e., elasticities versus proportional effects) 
2. Baseline mortality rates (i.e., year 2000 versus average over 1995-2008) 
3. Costs (i.e., 1% of public expenditure on health versus $1 per person) 
 
While econometric estimates differ between chapters 2 and 3, within each chapter they differ very 
little if at all between MICs and LICs.  Using Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015), the same proportional 
effects for under-5s, adult females and adult males are applied in LICs as in MICs.  Using Bokhari et al 
(2007), the elasticities differ little between MICs and LICs, with the average elasticity for under-5 and 
adult male being the same between the two and the average elasticity for adult female mortality 
being 0.01% lower in magnitude in LICs than MICs.31  As such, the difference must be driven by 
either baseline mortality rates or costs. 
 
The comparable proportional effects for Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) do not differ by country 
and were given in Table 4.  The proportional effect on under-5 mortality is larger (1.43%) than the 
corresponding average elasticity from Bokhari et al (2007), while the effects on adult female and 
adult male were smaller (0.07% and 0.06% respectively).  Given that CLE is higher for children under-
5 than for adults, we would expect more YLLs to be gained when using Moreno-Serra and Smith 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐŵŽĚĞůŝĨĂůůĞůƐĞǁĂƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ? 
 
Baseline mortality rates differ between MICs and LICs.  Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) use an 
average of the years 1995-2008 for which observations exist as the mortality rate, and in their 
dataset the average under-5 mortality rate is 3.3 times higher in LICs than in MICs and the average 
ĂĚƵůƚĨĞŵĂůĞ ?ŵĂůĞ ?ŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇƌĂƚĞŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŝŵĞƐŚŝŐŚĞƌŝŶ>/ƐƚŚĂŶD/Ɛ ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇŝŶŽŬŚĂƌŝ ?Ɛ
dataset and additional World Bank data on adult female and adult male mortality rates in 2000, the 
under-5 mortality rate is 3.5 times higher in LICs than MICs, while the adult female (male) mortality 
rate is 1.4 (2.0) times higher. 
 
Whilst Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) considers a $1 increase in public expenditure on health per 
capita Bokhari et al (2007) considers a 1% increase.  Therefore, although elasticities vary little for 
Bokhari et al (2007) and do not change in Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) and the patterns of 
baseline mortality rates do not grossly differ between the two time periods, cost per DALY averted 
may vary with income group owing to the assumptions around the change in public expenditure on 
health.  On average, a $1 increase in public expenditure on health per capita is 2.56 times greater for 
an LIC than a MIC.  The corresponding figure for a 1% increase in public expenditure on health per 
capita shows a completely different relationship with the absolute number of $s being 4.53 times 
greater for a MIC, on average, than a LIC.  Therefore we would expect the cost per YLLs averted from 
Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) to be relatively high for LICs and relatively low for MICs in 
comparison with Bokhari et al (2007). 
 
3.3 What are the morbidity effects of changes in expenditure? 
In section 2.3 three ways of getting at the morbidity effects of changes in expenditure were 
presented.  Only the first of these two was based only on mortality effects.  The second was based 
on the effect of expenditure on YLL and the third involved directly estimating YLD averted.  As the 
model employed by Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) requires panel data, we cannot estimate YLDs 
directly.  Nonetheless, we can make use of what was learned in section 2.3 about the effect of 
expenditure on YLDs relative to the effect of expenditure on mortality based estimates of survival.  
Thus we retain different options for calculating the effect of changes in expenditure on YLDs.  These 
are based on: 
 
                                                          
31
 See footnote 7 for more details. 
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1) survival effects as a surrogate for morbidity effects 
a. mortality based survival effects 
b. survival effects based on the relationship between directly estimated survival 
effects from section 2.2 and mortality-based survival effects 
2) the relationship between directly estimated effects on YLDs averted from section 2.2 
and mortality-based survival effects 
 
As in section 2.3, each of these is outlined below with a description of what they capture (the direct 
or indirect effects) and the assumptions associated with each.  The results are then compared to 
those from section 2.3. 
 
3.3.1 Indirectly estimating effects on morbidity from survival effects 
As we did previously in section 2.3, we can assume that the effect of changes in expenditure on YLLs 
(as measured by mortality based estimates or using the ratio from equation 36) is a good surrogate 
for the effect on YLD.  In other words, the proportional effect of the effect of a change in 
expenditure on YLD is the same as the proportional effect of the effect of a change in expenditure on 
YLL.  To implement this assumption, we need the ratio of total YLDs in a given country to total YLLs in 
that country, which are calculated by equation (23).  We apply this ratio ߛ௜  to the estimates of 
change in YLL due to changes in spending to obtain changes in YLD resulting from the hypothetical 
change in spend using equation (24).  If we believe that LMIC governments will give greater priority 
to averting mortality than morbidity, our assumption is optimistic and will provide an overestimate 
of YLDs averted.  Nonetheless, it is unlikely that changes in spending will have no effect at all on 
morbidity, and so the assumption we have made represents one option on a spectrum of 
possibilities. 
 
Using survival effects as a surrogate for morbidity captures the direct effect that changes in 
government spending on health will have on morbidity, but does not capture the indirect effect that 
spending will have through YLLs averted.  As in section 2.3, we can account for this effect by 
assuming that YLLs averted will be lived in average health.  This may be optimistic (as deaths averted 
may be among individuals with below average health), but represents a reasonable assumption.  
Thus this indirect effect can be calculated by equation (26) and YLDs averted are calculated by (27). 
 
3.3.2 Adjusting for directly estimated morbidity 
Although we cannot estimate the effect of changes in spending on YLDs directly in this section, we 
were able to in the previous section (2.3) since that model required only cross-sectional data.  We 
therefore do know something about the relationship between the effect of changes in spending on 
mortality and morbidity that can be applied here.  Specifically, we know the ratio between the 
directly estimated effect of spending on mortality and the directly estimated effect of spending on 
morbidity from section 2, which is expressed as: 
 
(38) ߮௜ ൌ ௒௅஽೔௒௅௅௔௩௘௥௧௘ௗǡ௔௟௟௔௚௘௦೔ 
 
The numerator is the number of YLDs averted in a given country based on the direct estimation of 
the effect of changes in spending on YLDs from the first part of section 2.3 and the denominator is 
the number of YLLs averted in that country based on the estimation of the effect of changes in 
spending on mortality (which have been scaled up to reflect the effect at the population level) from 
equation (21).  We can take this ratio and apply it to the estimate of the effect of changes in 
spending on mortality from the Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) model to get an estimate of what 
we might have estimated in terms of YLDs averted if there was panel data for YLDs and we could 
directly estimate it with this model. 
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(39) ܻܮܦܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ݈݈ܽܽ݃݁ݏ ൌ ߮௜ כ ܻܮܮܽݒ݁ݎݐ݁݀ǡ ݈݈ܽܽ݃݁ݏ 
 
Because this method uses a ratio that includes directly estimated YLDs from section 2, and directly 
estimated YLDs capture both the direct and indirect effects of changes in spending on morbidity, 
there is no need to make an adjustment to the YLLs calculated in section 3.2 when summing them to 
obtain DALYs. 
 
3.4 Adjusting for directly estimated effect on survival and morbidity 
We would ideally like to be able to estimate the effect of changes in government spending on health 
(as represented by DALYs, a summary measure of morbidity and mortality) directly, but due to the 
lack of panel data for DALYs we cannot.  We can, however, use what we know about the relationship 
between the estimate of the effect on survival and the direct estimation of DALYs from section 2.4 
by utilizing the following ratio: 
 
(44) ߱௜ ൌ ஽஺௅௒௔௩௘௥௧௘ௗ೔௒௅௅௔௩௘௥௧௘ௗǡ௔௟௟௔௚௘௦೔ 
 
This assumes that the relationship between the effect of changes in spending on DALYs and survival 
(as calculated by the scaled up YLL averted effects based on mortality effects) would be the same if 
we could directly estimate DALYs averted with the Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) dataset and 
model.  Because the ratio includes directly estimated DALYs averted, and that accounts for both the 
direct and indirect effect of changes in spending on morbidity, there is no need to adjust these 
estimates. 
 
3.5 Estimates of cost per DALY averted thresholds 
Using additional information gained in section 2 with GBD data from 2000, we are able to calculate 
four ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨĐŽƐƚƉĞƌ>zĂǀĞƌƚĞĚ ?ĞĂĐŚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚŽĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ?
age and gender distributions, baseline mortality rates, conditional LEs, and 2000 YLL and YLD 
burden.  (See Table 6.) 
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Table 6. Different methods for estimating and calculating DALYs averted from Moreno-Serra and Smith 
(2015) 
  
1 2 3 4 
YLL averted 
 
Based on 
indirectly 
estimating 
effects on 
survival from 
mortality 
"Directly 
estimated" 
(i.e., ratio of 
directly 
estimated to 
based on 
mortality 
effects from 
Bokhari) 
"Directly 
estimated" 
(i.e., ratio of 
directly 
estimated to 
based on 
mortality 
effects from 
Bokhari) 
"Directly 
estimated" 
(i.e., ratio of 
directly 
estimated to 
based on 
mortality 
effects from 
Bokhari) 
YLD averted 
Direct effect 
Uses 
mortality-
based 
survival 
effects as a 
surrogate for 
morbidity 
effects 
Uses 
"directly 
estimated" 
survival 
effects as a 
surrogate for 
morbidity 
effects 
"Directly 
estimated" 
(i.e., ratio of 
directly 
estimated to 
based on 
mortality 
effects from 
Bokhari) 
Indirect effect 
Uses average 
overall 
population 
health as a 
surrogate for 
increase in 
YLD burden 
associated 
with increase 
in YLLs 
averted 
Uses average 
overall 
population 
health as a 
surrogate for 
increase in 
YLD burden 
associated 
with increase 
in YLLs 
averted 
 
>z ?ĐĂŶďĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚĨƌŽŵďŽƚŚŽŬŚĂƌŝĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐĚĂƚĂĂŶĚŵŽĚĞůĂƐǁĞůůĂƐDŽƌĞŶŽ-Serra 
ĂŶĚ^ŵŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐĚĂƚĂĂŶĚŵŽĚĞů ?KǁŝŶŐƚŽůĂĐŬŽĨƉĂŶĞůĚĂƚĂŽǀĞƌƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐ ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ?ŽŶ
YLLs, YLDs and DALYs, DALYs 2-4 cannot be directly generated from the results of the Moreno-Serra 
and Smith (2015) model for Chapter 3.  The relationship between each of DALY 2, 3 and 4 in section 
3 and DALY 2, 3 and 4 in section 2 can be boiled down to the relationship between mortality based 
YLLs averted in each section.  And given that the same assumptions apply in each section with regard 
to obtaining YLDs averted, we can simplify the DALY calculation for DALYs 2, 3 and 4 to: 
 
(45)  ܥ݄Ǥ  ?ܦܣܮܻݔ ൌ ܥ݄Ǥ  ?ܦܣܮܻݔ כ஼௛Ǥଷ஽஺௅௒ଵ஼௛ଶǤ஽஺௅௒ଵ 
 
As in section 2.5, each estimate of DALYs averted is used to calculate a cost per DALY averted by 
equation (33).  The ranking of DALYs 1, 2 3 and 4 is unchanged between Chapters 2 and 3, and the 
observations reported in section 2.5 remain true here.  Namely, that when YLLs cannot be estimated 
directly, mortality based estimates of YLLs averted are a good alternative.  On the other hand, 
directly estimating YLDs averted results in far fewer averted than assuming that the effect of 
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changes in spending is the same on morbidity as it is on YLLs averted (whether mortality based or 
directly estimated), and as such where this assumption is applied the CET is likely to be an 
underestimate.  These are forgone conclusions given the ratios we've used to obtain DALYs 2-4 in 
section 3. 
 
However, more interestingly we can compare cost per DALY averted for DALY 1 between the 
Chapters 2 and 3.   Given that YLDs are not directly estimated in DALY 1, whether cost per DALY 
averted is higher or lower when based on Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) hinges upon whether cost 
per YLL averted from Chapter 3 is higher or lower than in Chapter 2.  This is discussed in detail in 3.2, 
where we show that the primary driver in differences between the two models is costs (i.e., 1% of 
public expenditure on health versus $1 per person). 
 
3.5.1 Low-income countries 
Figure 3 shows cost per DALY averted for LICs using Moreno-^ĞƌƌĂĂŶĚ^ŵŝƚŚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŵŽĚĞůĂŶĚ
data.  Cost per DALY averted is given in 2005 international $32; however, GDP per capita from 
Chapter 2 is used and is therefore given in 2000 international $.33 
 
The full range of cost per DALY averted estimates lies below 1x GDP per capita for 3 of the 45 
countries on the graph.  For more than half, the highest cost per DALY averted estimate is lower 
than 50% of 1x GDP per capita.  This further underscores the message from 3.5 that interventions 
adopted using a 1x GDP per capita threshold will displace more health than they generate. 
 
 
Figure 3. Cost per DALY averted estimates for low-income countries from Chapter 3 
                                                          
32
 Converted from PPP using http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.PPPC.RF, downloaded 13 November 2015. 
33
 Only LICs for which all 4 CdƐĐŽƵůĚďĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚĂƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ?ŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶŽŬŚĂƌŝĞƚĂů ?Ɛ
(2007) dataset are therefore excluded. 
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Given that the relative ranking of the cost per DALY averted estimates remains the same for each 
country in this chapter as in Chapter 2, all of the conclusions reached there remain true here.  
However, comparing cost per DALY averted between Chapters 2 and 3, we find that, on average, for 
countries in both samples, cost per DALY averted for DALY 1 is 223% higher in Chapter 3 than in 
Chapter 2.   
 
3.5.2 Middle-income countries 
Unlike in Chapter 2 where most cost per DALY averted estimates for middle-income countries fell 
below 1x GDP per capita, in Chapter 3 all fall below that arbitrary line, strengthening the point that 
the adoption of interventions or programmes using GDP based CETs will lead to a net health loss. 
 
In fact, the estimates of cost per DALY averted for middle-income countries are on average 57% as 
high as those estimated in Chapter 3.34  The range of estimates from Chapter 3 is also generally 
lower than from Chapter 2 for each country.  This results from the fact that all the variation within 
cost per DALY estimates from each section arises from the difference in the DALY estimates (and not 
the costs) and the cost per DALY averted thresholds are inversely proportional to the DALY 
estimates.  Hence it is not a surprise that the absolute range is larger when the change in spending is 
higher. 
 
 
Figure 4. Cost per DALY averted estimates for middle-income countries from Chapter 3
35
 
  
                                                          
34
 China and Costa Rica are omitted although they were included in Moreno-^ĞƌƌĂĂŶĚ^ŵŝƚŚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚĂƚĂƐĞƚĂƐƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ
no data on adult female and adult male mortality for these countries. 
35
 KŶůǇD/ƐĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚĂůů ?dƐĐŽƵůĚďĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚĂƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ?ŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞŶŽƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶŽŬŚĂƌŝĞƚĂů ?Ɛ
(2007) dataset are therefore excluded.  Jamaica was converted from PPP using the 2006 conversion factor as no conversion 
factor was available for 2005. 
32  CHE Research Paper 122 
4. Implications for policy and research 
The framework of analysis set out in this paper can be applied to the results of any econometric 
study which is thought to identify plausible effects on mortality of changes or differences in health 
expenditure.  The examples used illustrate two different, but sophisticated, approaches to 
identification in situations where country level cross section or panel data are available.  The analysis 
has demonstrated how survival effects can be derived when mortality effects are estimated as either 
elasticities or as absolute effects, whilst reflecting the epidemiology and demographics of specific 
countries.  The assumptions required to move from estimates of the effect of changes in 
expenditure on mortality to survival, morbidity, and ultimately to DALYs are made explicit.  By 
extending the cross sectional analysis to include other outcome data (see Chapter 2), it is also 
possible to estimate the effects on survival, morbidity and DALYs directly. This provides the 
opportunity to evaluate the assumptions required when estimating CETs from mortality effects 
alone.  The results indicate that, when summary measures of survival and health are estimated 
directly, the distribution of CETs is similar to those based only on estimated mortality effects. This 
suggests that the assumptions required to move from estimates of mortality effects to DALYs are not 
unreasonable. 
 
An important criticism of the Bokhari et al. (2007) and Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015) papers is that 
the identification strategy relies on an empirically observable relationship between 
contemporaneous public expenditure on health and mortality.  This has two drawbacks: i) the effect 
of spending on mortality is likely to be lagged, where spending in a year affects mortality not only in 
the present year, but in future years too; and ii) the relationship between different types of 
healthcare expenditures is not explicitly modeled, so, for example, an increase in public expenditure 
on health may be offset by a decrease in private expenditure on health.  Both limitations point to an 
underestimation of the effect of public expenditure on health, since neither lagged effects are 
captured, nor are substitution effects fully accounted for.  The implication of this is that the CETs are 
likely overestimated, since the relevant health effects are likely to have been underestimated. 
 
Using the data and models of Bokhari et al. (2007) and Moreno-Serra and Smith (2015), we are able 
to calculate a range of CETs for each LMIC.  All fall below 3x GDP per capita, a commonly accepted 
level above which a treatment or intervention is judged to be cost-ineffective, and nearly all are also 
below 1x GDP per capita, the commonly accepted level below which something is deemed highly 
cost-effective.  This suggests that current interventions acceptable at a 1x GDP per capita threshold 
(or even below it) may be displacing more health than they generate.  This is in line with the 
conclusion of Woods et al (2015), who also calculate CETs well below 1-3x GDP per capita.  We are 
able to compare the full range of estimates from Woods et al (2015) and from this study for 
countries included in both and for which all eight CETs could be calculated.  Our minimum and 
maximum estimates are generally lower than those found by Woods et al (2015), and when we use a 
crude method to inflate our estimates to 2013 international $ they are always lower.36 
 
Very few LMICs have estimated their own CETs, and while these estimates provide a range that can 
serve as a guide, within country estimates are ideal.  However, the only country to have conducted 
such a study to date is the UK where expenditure and mortality data are available at a local area and 
disease-specific level.  Such data is unlikely to be available for LMICs and further research is required 
which can make best use of what is currently available or could be easily collected or extracted from 
existing sources.  Within country estimates are preferable because they are best placed to directly 
estimate the opportunity cost of expenditure in a given country.  The approach taken in this paper is 
to use an identification strategy based on an international health production function, which is then 
used to inform an approximation of a country-specific health production function.  This second best 
                                                          
36
 Cost per DALY averted/(2000 GDP per capita/2013 GDP per capita) 
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approach is applied to country-specific baseline data to give country-specific CETs.  As such, these 
estimates can be considered as an improvement upon the type of norms that have been widely cited 
and could be used as interim guidance while research on within country estimates is undertaken. 
 
The major contribution of this paper, however, is not the specific range of estimates for particular 
countries but the demonstration that it is now possible to make what was previously an abstract and 
confused concept real.  Clarity about both the concept and the type of empirical analysis that can 
support its assessment can help inform decision making within low- and middle-income countries 
and influence how other supra national bodies make recommendations and investment and 
purchasing decisions.  As well as identifying the real value of devoting more resources to health care, 
these continuing research efforts can contribute to greater accountability in low- and middle-, as 
well as in high-income countries, for the health care and other expenditure decisions made at a 
local, national and supra national levels.  
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Appendix 1: Elasticities 
Table 7. Elasticities on YLLs, YLDs and DALYs averted for low- and middle income countries 
 
YLL YLD DALY 
 
YLL YLD DALY 
 
YLL YLD DALY 
Albania -0.29 -0.03 -0.21 Morocco -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Haiti -0.29 -0.04 -0.21 
Algeria -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Namibia -0.30 -0.04 -0.21 India -0.29 -0.03 -0.20 
Argentina -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Panama -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Indonesia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Belarus -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Paraguay -0.29 -0.04 -0.21 Kenya -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Belize -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Peru -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Kyrgyz R -0.29 -0.04 -0.21 
Bolivia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Philippines -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Madagascar -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Botswana -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Romania -0.29 -0.03 -0.21 Malawi -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Brazil -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Russia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Mali -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Bulgaria -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 South Africa -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Mauritania -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Cape Verde -0.29 -0.03 -0.21 Sri Lanka -0.26 -0.02 -0.18 Moldova -0.29 -0.03 -0.21 
Chile -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Swaziland -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Mongolia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
China -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Thailand -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Mozambique -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Colombia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Trinidad & 
Tobago -0.28 -0.03 -0.20 Nepal -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Costa Rica -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Tunisia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Nicaragua -0.29 -0.04 -0.21 
Croatia -0.29 -0.03 -0.21 Turkey -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Niger -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Dominican 
Republic -0.29 -0.04 -0.21 Uruguay -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Nigeria -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Ecuador -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Venezuela -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Pakistan -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Egypt -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Armenia -0.29 -0.03 -0.20 Rwanda -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
El Salvador -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Azerbaijan -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Senegal -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Equatorial 
Guinea -0.26 -0.06 -0.20 Bangladesh -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Sierra Leone -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Estonia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Benin -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Sudan -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Gabon -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Burkina 
Faso -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Tajikistan -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Guatemala -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Burundi -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Tanzania -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Guyana -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Cambodia -0.30 -0.04 -0.21 Togo -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Honduras -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Cameroon -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Turkmenistan -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Hungary -0.28 -0.03 -0.20 Chad -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Uganda -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Jamaica -0.27 -0.02 -0.19 Comoros -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Ukraine -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Jordan -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Congo, DR -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Uzbekistan -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Kazakhstan -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Congo, R. -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Vietnam -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
S. Korea -0.29 -0.03 -0.20 
Cote 
d'Ivoire -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Yemen -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Lebanon -0.29 -0.03 -0.20 Eritrea -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Zambia -0.29 -0.04 -0.21 
Lesotho -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Ethiopia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Zimbabwe -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Lithuania -0.28 -0.02 -0.19 Gambia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
    Macedonia -0.29 -0.03 -0.21 Georgia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
    Malaysia -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 Ghana -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
    Mauritius -0.28 -0.03 -0.20 Guinea -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
    
Mexico -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
Guinea-
Bissau -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 
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Appendix 2: CETs 
Table 8. Cost per DALY averted estimates for low-income countries 
 
  
 
Section 2 Section 3 
 
DALY 
1 
DALY 
2 
DALY 
3 
DALY 
4 
DALY 
1 
DALY 
2 DALY 3 DALY 4 
Armenia $591 $356 $514 $472 $507 $305 $441 $405 
Azerbaijan $104 $71 $98 $94 $223 $153 $210 $203 
Bangladesh $125 $78 $98 $102 $255 $159 $200 $208 
Benin $38 $25 $27 $31 $108 $70 $77 $89 
Bhutan 
    
$233 
   Burkina Faso $32 $25 $26 $32 $82 $63 $66 $81 
Burundi $19 $12 $13 $16 $73 $47 $50 $60 
Cambodia $112 $58 $69 $75 $176 $91 $108 $118 
Cameroon $29 $24 $26 $30 
    Central African Republic 
    
$171 
   Chad $18 $15 $15 $19 $77 $62 $64 $79 
Comoros $66 $47 $54 $62 $241 $174 $200 $229 
Congo, Dem. Rep. $23 $25 $26 $32 $97 $103 $109 $132 
Congo, Rep. $37 $26 $29 $34 
    Cote d'Ivoire $28 $33 $36 $42 $144 $172 $190 $221 
Eritrea $45 $19 $20 $24 $76 $32 $34 $40 
Ethiopia $8 $6 $6 $8 $93 $65 $70 $85 
Gambia, The $145 $116 $128 $151 $114 $92 $101 $119 
Georgia $190 $106 $152 $140 $491 $273 $394 $361 
Ghana $37 $32 $37 $42 $100 $88 $102 $114 
Guinea $72 $57 $60 $72 $71 $56 $59 $71 
Guinea-Bissau $45 $31 $33 $40 $72 $50 $52 $63 
Haiti $132 $77 $90 $98 
    India $32 $27 $34 $36 $189 $163 $200 $214 
Indonesia $74 $42 $56 $56 $244 $139 $186 $185 
Kenya $58 $48 $54 $63 $110 $92 $102 $120 
Kyrgyz Republic $195 $105 $135 $136 $202 $108 $140 $141 
Lesotho $139 $194 $217 $253 
    Liberia 
    
$77 
   Madagascar $26 $24 $28 $32 $90 $85 $99 $111 
Malawi $20 $24 $25 $30 $136 $161 $170 $207 
Mali $13 $13 $13 $17 $56 $55 $56 $71 
Mauritania $64 $54 $63 $69 $112 $94 $109 $121 
Moldova $146 $128 $180 $169 $577 $506 $713 $670 
Mongolia $165 $122 $153 $162 $173 $128 $160 $169 
Mozambique $83 $72 $76 $92 $140 $122 $129 $155 
Nepal $56 $32 $38 $41 $141 $80 $95 $104 
Nicaragua $842 $419 $578 $545 $371 $185 $255 $240 
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Niger $8 $10 $10 $12 $52 $60 $61 $77 
Nigeria $3 $3 $4 $4 $45 $51 $53 $65 
Pakistan $44 $36 $43 $48 $121 $100 $119 $131 
Rwanda $43 $44 $48 $57 $91 $94 $100 $119 
Senegal $86 $68 $76 $87 $134 $107 $118 $136 
Sierra Leone $12 $13 $14 $17 
    Solomon Islands  
   
$724 
   Sudan $22 $19 $21 $25 
    Tajikistan $20 $17 $20 $22 $153 $126 $153 $166 
Tanzania $20 $19 $20 $24 $85 $78 $85 $101 
Togo $53 $39 $44 $50 $135 $100 $113 $128 
Turkmenistan $387 $285 $364 $378 
    Uganda $63 $49 $52 $63 $88 $68 $72 $87 
Ukraine $252 $185 $242 $242 $552 $405 $531 $531 
Uzbekistan $333 $228 $298 $302 $206 $141 $184 $187 
Vietnam $172 $110 $168 $147 $369 $236 $362 $315 
Yemen, Rep. $48 $29 $34 $38 $108 $66 $76 $86 
Zambia $36 $27 $28 $34 $82 $60 $63 $77 
Zimbabwe $160 $170 $191 $218 
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Table 9. Cost per DALY averted estimates for middle-income countries 
 
Section 2 Section 3 
 
DALY 
1 
DALY 
2 
DALY 
3 
DALY 
4 DALY 1 DALY 2 DALY 3 DALY 4 
Albania $840 $386 $592 $510 $931 $428 $656 $565 
Algeria $507 $337 $503 $450 $374 $248 $371 $332 
Argentina 
    
$1707* $1037* $1541* $1379* 
Bahrain 
    
$1289 
   Belarus $1244 $835 $1140 $1092 $741 $497 $679 $651 
Belize $2190 $1005 $1367 $1321 $772 $354 $482 $465 
Bolivia $323 $231 $287 $303 $189 $136 $168 $178 
Botswana $567 $521 $580 $667 $397 $365 $406 $467 
Brazil $1747 $1259 $1809 $1675 $798 $575 $826 $765 
Bulgaria $967 $686 $973 $904 $837 $594 $842 $782 
Cape Verde $1220 $662 $955 $872 
    Chile $4194 $2598 $4294 $3488 
    China $584 $369 $523 $496 
    Colombia $1827 $1190 $1702 $1581 $681 $444 $635 $589 
Costa Rica $9137 $3532 $6034 $4747 
    Croatia $4569 $3336 $5090 $4410 $2019 $1474 $2249 $1949 
Czech Republic     $1740    
Djibouti 
    
$252 
   Dominican Republic $1194 $743 $1041 $974 $539 $335 $470 $440 
Ecuador $431 $265 $372 $351 $474 $291 $409 $386 
Egypt, Arab Rep. $324 $199 $280 $264 $173 $106 $149 $141 
El Salvador $1234 $936 $1286 $1242 $670 $508 $699 $674 
Estonia $2770 $1874 $2566 $2452 $1503 $1017 $1393 $1330 
Fiji 
    
$838 
   Gabon $369 $201 $237 $257 $272 $148 $175 $190 
Guatemala $495 $330 $413 $437 $290 $194 $242 $256 
Guyana $657 $417 $552 $548 $301 $191 $252 $251 
Honduras $868 $410 $556 $542 $498 $235 $319 $311 
Hungary $3357 $2685 $3921 $3527 $1792 $1433 $2092 $1882 
Iraq 
    
$168 
   Jamaica $950 $794 $1121 $1062 $902** $753** $1064** $1008** 
Jordan $1316 $840 $1239 $1121 $445 $284 $419 $379 
Kazakhstan $269 $196 $247 $257 $310 $226 $284 $296 
Korea, Rep. $9444 $4934 $8049 $6705 $2962 $1548 $2525 $2103 
Latvia 
    
$936 
   Lebanon $4441 $2308 $3523 $3132 $1235 $642 $979 $871 
Lithuania $2046 $1496 $2134 $1983 $1478 $1081 $1541 $1433 
Macedonia, FYR $2468 $1128 $1781 $1478 $852 $389 $614 $510 
Malaysia $1691 $918 $1551 $1233 $1017 $552 $933 $742 
Maldives 
    
$780 
   Malta 
    
$2444 
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Mauritius $1791 $1192 $1847 $1609 $1082 $720 $1115 $972 
Mexico $4716 $2364 $3389 $3183 $1105 $554 $794 $746 
Morocco $478 $268 $385 $355 $412 $231 $332 $306 
Namibia $1330 $799 $932 $1022 $464 $279 $325 $357 
Oman 
    
$856 
   Panama $3874 $2251 $3463 $3000 $726 $422 $649 $562 
Paraguay $1037 $608 $884 $798 $368 $216 $314 $283 
Peru $1300 $659 $967 $875 $411 $208 $306 $277 
Philippines $410 $321 $447 $426 $301 $235 $328 $313 
Poland 
    
$1781 
   Romania $1459 $1215 $1716 $1609 $976 $813 $1148 $1077 
Russian Federation $688 $705 $926 $914 
    Saudi Arabia 
    
$619 
   South Africa $955 $860 $1022 $1119 $576 $519 $617 $675 
Sri Lanka $267 $204 $305 $274 $571 $437 $653 $587 
Suriname 
    
$415 
   Swaziland $303 $276 $311 $352 $275 $250 $282 $319 
Thailand $805 $486 $672 $644 $805 $486 $672 $644 
Trinidad and Tobago $1623 $1048 $1543 $1401 $868 $561 $826 $750 
Tunisia $2989 $1884 $2939 $2530 $635 $400 $624 $538 
Turkey $2249 $1374 $2009 $1830 $798 $487 $713 $649 
Uruguay $7827 $4070 $5961 $5348 $866 $450 $660 $592 
Venezuela $1875 $1290 $1945 $1729 $717 $493 $744 $661 
* Estimates presented in PPP (conversion factor not available) 
** PPP conversion factor from 2006 used (conversion factor for 2005 not available) 
 
